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Introduction
In Professor Grant Gilmore's view, the purpose of "general commer-
cial legislation" is to clarify business law rather than to improve business
practices.' The legislation is designed to "state as matter of law the
conclusion which the business community apart from statute and as matter
of fact gives to the transaction in any case. "2 Thus, the transaction's legal
consequences will match the parties' expectations.
The Uniform Commercial Code meets Gilmore's description; its
"underlying purposes and policies" are facilitative rather than regulatory
1. Grant Gilmore, On the Difflculties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J.
1341, 1341 (1948).
2. Id.
3. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-102(2) (1990) [hereinafter U.C.C.]. There are, of
course, limits to this approach. See id. §§ 1-203, 2-302, -719(2), (3).
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REVISION OF ARTICLE 2
The obvious question for its drafters, therefore, is how to identify the
conclusion that the business community gives to a particular transaction
"apart from statute and as matter of fact."'
Professor Lawrence Friedman points out that the original drafters of
the Code did not base their work on studies of business practices:
Devotion to business practice was deeply felt; nonetheless, it was
window dressing at bottom. The Code did not start out with empirical
studies of what business wanted, or with a theory of what the economy
needed. Some Wall Street lawyers and businessmen were asked their
opinions; but there were no real explorations of what was wrong (if
anything) with the way law intersected the business world.'
Friedman found the resulting Code "curiously old-fashioned," focused on
problems of "disorder in doctrine, clashing case law, and what seemed to be
unlovely and unsympathetic arrangements of statutes. "6 In the major
revision of the Code that is now under way,7 Reporters and Drafting
Committees are again proceeding without empirical studies As a result,
the product of their efforts may well be as academic9 as the original version.
4. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1341.
5. LAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 581-82 (1973); see also
John E. Murray, Jr., The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51
OR. L. REV. 269, 297 (1972) [hereinafter Murray, Realism].
6. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 581.
7. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has revised
Articles 3 and 6, amended Article 4, and promulgated Articles 2A and 4A. U.C.C. arts. 3,
6,4, 2A (1990), 4A (1989). Drafting Committees are preparing revised versions of Articles
2 and 8. Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 2, Sales (Tentative Draft July 29-August
5 1994) [hereinafter July 1994 Draft Revision]. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Good Faith
Transferees of U.S. Treasury Securities and Other Weird Ideas: Making Federal Commercial
Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 717 (1993). Revision of Article 9 is under way as well.
Bryan D. Hull, Foreword: "Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and Well?", 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
535, 535-36 (1993). See generally Symposium, Is the UCC Dead, or Alive and Well?, 26
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 535 (1993).
8. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, ActingLike a Lobbyist: Some
Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 743, 770-72
(1993). There are, of course, some published studies of contracting behavior available to
those involved in the revision process. See infra notes 192-260 and accompanying text.
9. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 581-82.
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Professor Karl Llewellyn, the "principal drafter"'" of Article 2 of the
Code, employed a drafting style that is, in theory, responsive to Friedman's
criticism." Llewellyn believed that the solution to any problem of
commercial law is "immanent" in the commercial setting that gave rise to the
problem. 2 Article 2 directs courts to discover and implement immanent
solutions, deciding each case on the basis of a focused empirical inquiry. 3
The inquiry will produce information not only about the events that led
directly to the transaction in dispute, but also about any relevant aspects of
the parties' past dealings with each other and the practices of their industry.
Thus, the lack of empirical studies at the Code drafting stage becomes
irrelevant when the parties give the court a comprehensive education in the
business realities that bear on their dispute. 4 Indeed, the resulting Code
is far more flexible than, and therefore preferable to, any attempted codifica-
tion of practices revealed in empirical studies. 5
10. James J. White, Promise Fulfilled and Principle Betrayed, 1988 ANN. SURv. AM.
L. 7, 16.
11. See, e.g., Permanent Editorial Board Study Group Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2, Richard E. Speidel, Chair, Preliminary Report, Introduction at 9 (March 1, 1990)
[hereinafter Prelim. Rpt.].
12. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 122 (1960); see also
Prelim. Rpt., supra note 11, Introduction at 11; Richard Danzig, A Comment on the
Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621, 624-27 (1975).
13. Professor White rightly points out that Article 2 does establish some rules, thus
prescribing solutions to at least some problems of commercial law. White, supra note 10,
at 18-21. The rules he describes, however, §§ 2-319, -320, -509, -706, and -712, are default
rules, subject to change by agreement. See U.C.C. §§ 2-319, -320, -509(4), -718(1), -719
(1990). And the agreement is part of the immanent solution. See infra notes 44-63 and
accompanying text. For a rule that is subject to change by agreement only in part, however,
see U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1990). See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-10 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing "limits on freedom of
contract" in Article 2).
14. Prelim. Rpt., supra note 11, Introduction at 9; see also Richard E. Speidel,
Contract Law: Some Reflections Upon Commercial Context and the Judicial Process, 1967
Wis. L. REV. 822, 829-32. See generally Murray, Realism, supra note 5.
References throughout this paper to judicial inquiries into commercial context do not
mean, of course, that trials in commercial cases are to be conducted in the inquisitorial rather
than the adversarial mode. Rather, the parties are to present evidence of context in response
to the dictates of the Code. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1990).
15. Gilmore, supra note 1; Prelim. Rpt., supra note 11, Introduction at 9.
REVISION OF ARTICLE 2
The centerpiece of Llewellyn's methodology is the notion of
agreement; the court's initial inquiry is into the bargain, if any, that the
parties have made. 6 The Code definition of the term "agreement" makes
clear that the parties' actual agreement, rather than any deemed agreement,
is the focus of the inquiry. 7 And by incorporating implied terms and
meanings, the definition also makes clear that the parties are to provide any
relevant information about their past dealings and industry practices. 8
An Article 2 Study Group, whose recommendation led to the revision
of the Article, echoes 9 the widely held view that Llewellyn's drafting style
has stood the test of time,2' and the draft revisions to date indicate that the
Drafting Committee concurs.2 Thus, all indications are that revised
Article 2 will maintain Llewellyn's response to Friedman: a commercial
code need not be based on ex ante empirical studies if it directs courts to
discover commercial reality in the cases before them.
At least one tenet of Llewellyn's thought is at odds with this approach,
however. In thinking about contract formation by means of standard form
documents, he conceived of the notion of "blanket assent. "I A party
16. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
17. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1990).
18. Id.
19. Prelim. Rpt. supra note 11, Introduction at 16-17.
20. E.g., Peter A. Alces, Roll Over, Llewellyn?, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 543, 549
(1993); Anita F. Hill, Is The UCCDead orMerely Languishing?, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 651,
657 (1993). For a dissenting view, see Danzig, supra note 12, at 635. Danzig agrees,
however, that "normative insight is enriched by empirical observations." Richard Danzig,
Legal Realism: Conunentary, 1988 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 49, 65.
21. See generally July 1994 Draft Revision, supra note 7. The draft makes few
substantive changes in the basic formation and interpretation sections of Article 2. See, e.g.,
id. at 11 (the proposed revision of § 2-204); id. at 18-23 (the proposed revisions of §§ 2-301
to -3 10); see also Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under Revised
Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1305, 1311-12 (1994).
22. The notion represents Llewellyn's solution to the problem of which, if any, of the
boilerplate provisions in a standard form document of sale the law should enforce:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize
that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact
been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type
of the transaction, and but one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket
assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the
seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable
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that' agrees to engage in a transaction described in the other party's form
document of sale gives a blanket, as opposed to specific, assent to any "not
unreasonable or indecent" terms the document may contain.24 If the party
later seeks to avoid enforcement of a form term, the only question is whether
the term is unreasonable or indecent and therefore outside the scope of the
assent; the assent itself is assumed, and need not be proven by the sender of
the document.'
Had blanket assent remained in the realm of theory, the formation and
interpretation sections of Articles 1 and 2 of the Code would have been
relatively uniform in their call for a focused empirical study in each case.
Article 2 contains one section, however, that codifies the notion. Section
2-207,26 on "Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation," makes
sense only if the parties to a particular sales transaction give blanket assents
to the form terms of each other's documents.2'
meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print which has not been read has
no business to cut under the reasonable meaning of those dickered terms
which constitute the dominant and only real expression of agreement, but
much of it commonly belongs in.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 12, at 370.
23. This paper refers to parties "that" engage in transactions rather than those "who"
engage in transactions because, at least in the reported cases dealing with "additional" terms,
see infra notes 102, 146 and accompanying text, the parties are usually business firms rather
than individuals. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40
YALE L.J. 704, 733 n.63 (1931).
24. LLEWELLYN, supra note 12, at 370.
25. Although Llewellyn does not quite make this explicit, his description of the notion
of blanket assent makes clear both that in his view there is no actual assent to particular form
clauses, and that the issue for the court is reasonableness. Id.; see also Caroline N. Brown,
Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A Framework for Making Uniform Commercial
Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L. REv. 893 (1991); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1198-1206 (1983).
Professor Rakoff suggests that for Llewellyn the notion of blanket assent may have
"represented a strategic compromise in its day; by conceding the enforcement of reasonable
clauses, [blanket assent] helped to establish the legitimacy of refusing to enforce outrageous
form terms." Id. at 1201.
26. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1990).
27. Danzig characterizes part of the Llewellyn passage describing blanket assent as
"Llewellyn's retrospective comment on... § 2-207," Danzig, supra note 12, at 629 n.30,
but this is mistaken; Llewellyn mentions several Code sections in the discussion in which the
passage appears, but they do not include § 2-207. LLEWELLYN, supra note 12, at 369-70; see
REVISION OF ARTICLE 2
In this transaction, the "battle of the forms," a buyer and a seller of
goods send each other form ' documents of sale, printed on paper, that do
not match completely. The documents match with respect to "perfor-
mance"29 terms, such as the quantity, description, and price of the goods,
and the time and manner of delivery and payment, but not with respect to
"breakdown" terms, such as warranties, dispute resolution, or remedies.
The parties perform despite the differences between their documents, and
blanket assent establishes the breakdown terms of the resulting agreement.3 0
By enforcing those terms, section 2-207 legislates a preconceived, stereotyp-
ical model of the transaction."
Rakoff, supra note 25, at 1199 n.96. For purposes of this paper's analysis, however, the
point is not that Llewellyn himself applied the notion of blanket assent to § 2-207, but rather
that the notion helps explain the section's rules. See infra text accompanying notes 99-145.
28. Nothing in § 2-207's text limits its coverage to transactions involving form
documents. Indeed, subsection (1) applies both to "[a] definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance" and to "a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time." U.C.C.
§ 2-207(1) (1990). Thus an acceptance need not even be in writing, much less in a printed
form, and a confirmation need not be printed. See also id. cmt. 1. In their discussion of
§ 2-207, Professors White and Summers describe eight transaction types to which the section
may apply, only one of which involves non-form communications. WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 13, § 1-3. In the authors' assessment, the section does serve a useful purpose as
applied to some non-form communications. Id. at 47.
Commentators on the section have focused principally on its application to
transactions that involve form documents of sale. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 25, at 899
(Section 2-207 is "generally understood" to apply only where "at least one party's preprinted
form plays a role"-a limitation that "makes good sense."); Gregory M. Travalio, Clearing
the Air After the Battle: Reconciling Fairness and Efficiency in a Formal Approach to U. C. C.
Section 2-207, 33 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 327, 367-68 (1983). Professor Wladis reports that
the Code drafters first began to consider the application of § 2-207 to the battle of the forms
in the early 1950s. John D. Wladis, U.C.C. Section 2-207: The Drafting History, 49 Bus.
LAW. 1029, 1040-41 (1994).
29. Professors Barron and Dunfee employ this terminology. Paul Barron & Thomas
W. Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review, Reflection and Revision, 24 CLEv. ST. L. REV.
171, 174 (1975).
30. See infra notes 99-145 and accompanying text.
31. White uses this terminology, referring to the "model transactions contemplated in
section 2-207." White, supra note 10, at 34. He also attributes the failure of the section to
the fact that the Code drafters "were incapable of understanding the underlying transaction."
Id. at 37. He does not, however, connect blanket assent with the model that underlies the
section.
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 599 (1994)
This striking departure from Llewellyn's general methodology
produced a section that Gilmore deemed "arguably the greatest statutory
mess of all time. "32 Judges and scholars alike have agreed with Gilmore's
assessment, and most scholars have concluded that revision of the section is
in order." In laying foundations for revision, these writers have not set out
to describe alternative transactional models for the battle of the forms.
34
Yet they have done so in effect by making assumptions about the agreements
that issue from the battle. Thus, the rich and voluminous literature on the
section35 in large measure replicates the choice of the original Code drafters
to treat the battle of the forms as a special case of contract formation and
interpretation.
This paper argues that the drafters of revised Article 2 must reject this
approach. In the absence of strong empirical support, no Code section
should be based on the notion of blanket assent, or any other preconception
about the agreements that issue from the battle of the forms. Because the
simple fact of § 2-207's existence suggests that ordinary formation and
interpretation principles do not apply, the drafters should not include it in the
revised Code.'
32. Letter from Grant Gilmore to Robert S. Summers (September 10, 1980), reprinted
in RIcHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., SALES & SECURED TRANSACTIONS 513, 514 (5th ed. 1993).
33. See e.g., Prelim. Rpt. supra note 11, pt. 2, at 20-23 (recommending "major
revision"). The Drafting Committee has considered several possible revisions. See July 1994
Draft Revision, supra note 7, at 13-14; Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 2, Sales,
Parts 1, 2, 3, and 7 (Tentative Draft December 21, 1993), pts. 1-3, at 15-18; Uniform
Commercial Code Revised Article 2, Sales Parts 1-6 (Tentative Draft September 10, 1993),
at 15-21 [hereinafter September 1993 Draft Revision]; Uniform Commercial Code Revised
Article 2, Sales Parts 1 and 2, pt. 2, at 21-38 (Tentative Draft April 2, 1992) [hereinafter
1992 Draft Revision].
34. Indeed, two of the writers use the term "model" in describing conceptions with
which they disagree. See infra notes 101, 149.
35. For bibliographies, see Brown, supra note 25, at 893 n.2; Charles M. Thatcher,
Sales Contract Formation and Content-An Annotated Apology for a Proposed Revision of
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207,32 S.D. L. REV. 181, 182 n.3 (1987). Professors Knapp
and Crystal describe Professor Thatcher's bibliography as "presumably exhaustive and
certainly exhausting." CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW 306 (3d ed. 1993). Most recently, see Ending the "Battle of the Forms":A
Symposium on the Revision of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 49 Bus. LAW.
1019 (1994).
36. The Article 2 Study Group "reserved judgment" on a suggestion by Professor
Honnold that the section be eliminated. Permanent Editorial Board Study Group Uniform
REVISION OF ARTICLE 2
Instead, the drafters should revise section 2-204, the basic Article 2
formation section, to emphasize the applicability of those principles to the
problem of nonmatching communications in sales transactions." The
revised section should provide simply that if one party proposes a term,
whether in a form document or otherwise, the other party may agree to the
term either expressly or by implication. In the absence of express or implied
agreement, the proposed term is not enforceable unless it corresponds to a
term the law supplies in any event. If the parties do business with
nonmatching documents, the section will prompt the judicial inquiry into
agreement and commercial context that Llewellyn envisioned.
Use of Llewellyn's general methodology and avoidance of transac-
tional models are necessary in the current revision process for two reasons.
First, commentators on section 2-207 have cited some empirical data
concerning the contracts buyers and sellers of goods make when they send
each other form documents that are printed on paper. These data indicate
that any transactional model will probably be inaccurate in many cases.
Moreover, the advent of computer technology has brought changes both to
sales documents and to the manner of their transmission, further complicat-
ing the patterns of behavior on which any model must be based. Given these
changes, indeed, the very notion of a standard form document of sale may
become unworkable.
Second, and perhaps more important, the overall design of the Code
is in flux, responding to major changes in technology and in the economies
of the United States and other countries. In response to the growth of sales
of services and the relative decline of sales of goods in the American econ-
omy,3" for example, the drafters of the revised Code are tentatively planning
Commercial Code Article 2, Richard E. Speidel, Chair, Executive Summary, at 14 n.19
(March 5, 1991). The Drafting Committee has rejected the suggestion. See July 1994 Draft
Revision, supra note 7, at 13-14; Speidel, supra note 21, at 1325-26. For advocacy of an
approach similar to this paper's in the context of international sales, see Christine Moccia,
Note, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and
the "Battle of the Forms," 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 649 (1990).
37. This proposal is consistent with the Study Group recommendation that the revision
of § 2-207 "draw on and be consistent with the underlying policies of Article 2, Part 2,
particularly § 2-204." Prelim. Rpt., supra note 11, pt. 2, at 21.
38. See Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalisation Around the North Atlantic, 55
MOD. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992); Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sector
of Commercial Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 725, 725 (1993).
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to bring some service transactions within its scope.39 Assumptions that argu-
ably make sense when applied to sales of goods may make no sense when
applied to sales of services. To the extent that the drafters recognize differences
among transactions, therefore, any transactional models they adopt will inevita-
bly be both complex and varied. Provisions based on those models will be
equally complex and varied, and the revised Code will exhibit, in new forms,
the technicalities and inconsistencies that riddled pre-Code commercial law.A'
Although this paper's specific focus is the need to eliminate section
2-207, then, its more general argument is that in the current revision the
drafters must maintain an emphasis on the notion of actual agreement through-
out Article 2. Indeed, they must draft provisions that will bring that emphasis
home to generalist judges and lawyers, as well as to specialists in commercial
law.41 If they fail to do so, Llewellyn will have no answer to Friedman's
criticism of revised Article 2.
Part I briefly summarizes the basic sections in Article 2, as well as the
definitional sections in Article 1, that direct courts to analyze sales in their com-
mercial context and to focus first on the parties' agreement. It then highlights
the contrast between these sections and existing section 2-207 and concludes by
proposing a revised version of section 2-204 (proposed section 2-204). The
proposed section applies the approach of the basic sections to the problem of
"additional" terms, 42 sharpening the focus on agreement and simplifying and
clarifying existing section 2-204.
39. Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 2, Sales Chapter 3 (Tentative Draft
February 10, 1994) [hereinafter February 1994 Draft Revision].
40. The first Tentative Draft of Chapter 3 of Article 2 illustrates the danger. The draft
includes § 2-2203, on "Mass Market Licenses," which will govern "shrink wrap licenses" of
computer software, id. at 79, despite the fact that at least one court has held that these licenses
are subject to § 2-207. Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 98-99 (3d Cir.
1991). Section 2-2203 in effect treats cases involving shrink wrap licenses as even more special
than cases involving the battle of the forms. It is longer and more complex than § 2-207 and is
evidently based on blanket assent. See id. § 2-2203(a), (b). On the dangers of detailed and
complex code provisions, see Alces, supra note 20; Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1355-59.
41. The Article's semantics will play an important role. See infra text accompanying notes
91-92, 368-69. For an argument that revised Articles 3 and 4 are "inaccessible to most of their
users," see Lary Lawrence, Wat Would be Wrong With a User-Friendly Code?: The Drafting
of Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 659, 659
(1993).
42. Section 2-207 governs both cases of "additional" terms and cases of "different" terms.
U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1990). References in this paper to the law of "additional terms" are to the
law that governs both kinds of terms.
REVISION OF ARTICLE 2
Part II describes the "blanket assent" model on which section 2-207 is
based, as well as the three alternative models that appear in the scholarly
commentary on the section. It then reviews the empirical evidence cited in the
commentary, which indicates that none of these models enjoys sufficient
empirical support to merit incorporation in Article 2.
Part III highlights the differences between proposed section 2-204 and
revisions based on the transactional models43 by applying each to a hypothet-
ical sales transaction. Although the models vary in their sensitivity to com-
mercial context, any model-based revision is likely to obscure evidence of
actual agreement in some cases. Part III therefore concludes that the drafters
of the revised Code should eliminate section 2-207 and adopt the proposed
section.
L Code Fundamentals and the Law of Additional Terms
A. Articles 1 and 2
Articles 1 and 2 direct courts to begin their search for immanent
solutions by discovering" the parties' agreement, if any.45 The agreement
is the "bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of
trade or course of performance. "I Terms implied from course of dealing,
usage of trade, or course of performance ("implied" terms) are thus part of
the bargain the parties have made;47 the court's inquiry is not to end with an
examination of express terms.
43. The comparison involves only three of the four models; the fourth is not susceptible
to this kind of comparison. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
44. For use of this terminology, see John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The
Underlying Philosophy ofArticle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 20
(1982) [hereinafter Murray, The Article 2 Prism].
45. See, e.g., SPEIDEL ET AL., supra note 32, at 478, 572; Murray, The Article 2 Prism,
supra note 44, at 21.
46. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1990).
47. Id. "One of the most significant changes effected by the Code is the treatment of
trade usage as an actual part of agreements." Amy H. Kastely, Stock Equipment for the Bargain
in Fact: Trade Usage, "Express Terms," and Consistency Under Section 1-205 of the Umform
Commercial Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 777, 778 (1986). For discussion of implication of terms
from course of dealing, see infra note 312 and accompanying text.
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In sections 1-205(4)' and 2-208(2), 49 the Code drafters adopted an
important general rule of construction to aid courts in resolving conflicts
among apparent components of an agreement: express terms control over
implied terms;5" and among implied terms course of performance controls
over course of dealing and usage of trade,"' and course of dealing controls
over usage of trade. 2 Thus, in general, the parties' performance under the
agreement is the best implied indicator of their intent, their series of earlier
transactions is the next best, and practice in their industry ranks last.
In determining whether an agreement exists, courts must disregard
artificial pre-Code principles such as the requirement of a high degree of
definiteness. Section 2-204 prescribes a flexible approach:
§ 2-204. Formation in General.
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale
may be found even though the moment of its making is undeter-
mined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for
sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to
make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an
appropriate remedy. 3
Various "gap-filler" sections in Article 2 require courts to supply
terms ("supplied" terms) that parties have omitted from their agreements.54
Like the definition of agreement, these sections are responsive to business
settings; the supplied terms are those that are commercially reasonable under
the circumstances of the individual case, and the facts that bear on the
reasonableness of a supplied term may also bear on the meaning of an agreed
48. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1990).
49. U.C.C. § 2-208(2) (1990).
50. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1990).
51. U.C.C. § 2-208(2) (1990).
52. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1990).
53. U.C.C. § 2-204 (1990).
54. These include §§ 2-305, -308, and -309. U.C.C. §§ 2-305, -308, -309 (1990). See
generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, §§ 3-4 to -9.
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term.55 Thus, a court may extract and apply "values and norms which are
'immanent' in the relevant context... whether they emerge in determining
the agreement in fact of the parties or in filling 'gaps' in that agreement. "56
Discovery of the terms of the factual bargain is not the end of the
process because the parties' obligations are not necessarily the same as the
bargain's terms. A "contract" is the "total legal obligation which results
from the parties' agreement as affected by [the Code] and any other
applicable rules of law."'  The parties' contract might well contain a
warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose, for example,
even if their agreement did not. 8
The distinction between agreement and contract is of vital importance.
If the Code drafters had not intended to require an inquiry into factual
bargains, they could simply have used the term contract to refer to the set of
legal obligations that results from the parties' transaction. 9 This would
have held no suggestion that courts should distinguish between terms that the
parties select and those that the law supplies. The separate definition of
agreement indicates clearly that courts are to examine the factual bargain
independently of any resulting legal obligations.'
The overriding message of the basic formation and interpretation
sections, then, is that courts must examine all express and implied indicia of
the parties' agreement, as well as its business setting. Courts that are
tempted to simplify this process by focusing only on writings6' receive
scant encouragement; even the hierarchy among express and implied terms
is stated in general language, and Professors James White and Robert
Summers report that the hegemony of express terms is more apparent than
55. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 7(1990). Accord, SPEIDEL ET AL., supra note 32, at 884.
56. Prelim. Rpt., supra note 11, Introduction at 11. Cf. Speidel, supra note 14, at 827.
57. U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1990).
58. U.C.C. §§ 2-314(1), -315 (1990). In either case, the warranty is supplied by the
Code, rather than implied from course of dealing or usage of trade. Section 2-314(3), on the
other hand, provides for warranties arising from course of dealing or usage of trade. Id. § 2-
314(3).
59. See generally ARTHUR L. CORBIN, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3 (1963).
60. See SPEIDEL ET AL., supra note 32, at 478 ("The Code itself recognizes the
primacy of agreement.").
61. E.g., Murray, Realism, supra note 5, at 290-93.
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real, in at least some jurisdictions.62 Although the agreement is not
necessarily controlling in all respects, it is the "foundation stone"'63 of
Article 2.
B. Section 2-207
The Code drafters adopted section 2-207 in part to address the
common law "mirror image" rule, according to which parties had not made
an agreement if the terms of their communications did not match.' This
rule was likely to produce unjust results when applied to transactions in
which one or both parties used a form document of sale. If an offer and a
purported acceptance contained the same performance terms, the parties
would probably believe they had a contract for sale. Yet if the form
breakdown terms of their documents did not match, the purported acceptance
was a counteroffer-both a refusal to make a bargain on the offeror's terms
and an offer to make a bargain on the offeree's terms. Thus, quite possibly
contrary to the parties' expectations, there was no contract despite the
exchange of documents.' If they performed despite the differences
between their documents, the "last shot" rule 6 held that they had made a
contract on the terms of the last document sent-the last shot in the battle of
the forms.67
62. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 3-3, at 125; see also U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt.
2 (1990).
63. SPEIDEL El AL., supra note 32, at 478.
64. See, e.g., WHITE &SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 1-3, at 29-30; Brown, supra note
25, at 901; Murray, The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV.
1307, 1331 n.93 (1986) [hereinafter Murray, Solutions] (citing 1 RICHARD M. ALDERMAN,
A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 15 n.42 (2d ed. 1983)
(formerly Hawkland)).
65. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER& MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 602-
04 (5th ed. 1990); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 1-3, at 29-30; Daniel A. Levin &
Ellen Blumberg Rubert, Beyond U. C. C. Section 2-207: Should ProfessorMurray 's Proposed
Revision Be Adopted?, 11 J.L. & COM. 175, 175-77 (1992).
66. Frederick Lipman, Esq., attributes this term to Professor Hawkland. Frederick D.
Lipman, On Winning the Battle of the Forms: An Analysis of Section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 24 Bus. LAW. 789, 792-93 (1969).
67. See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 29, at 176-77; Levin & Rubert, supra note 65,
at 177-78.
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Section 2-207 was designed to alter substantially both the mirror image
rule and the last shot rule,6" and courts69 and commentators' alike recog-
nize that the section has done so:
§ 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates
as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different
from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part
of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of
the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time after
notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such
case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on
which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplemen-
tary terms incorporated under any other provisions of [the Code].
If the drafters had been content simply to change these two rules, the
section might have been much more successful. In subsection (2) and the
second sentence of subsection (3), however, they went much farther,
prescribing new rules that determine the terms of contracts formed under the
section. Subsection (2) creates two general rules: the initial terms of a
68. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 25, at 901-04.
69. See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (6th Cir.
1972).
70. See, e.g., WHITE& SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 1-3. The authors' summary of the
§ 2-207 case law reveals that the section has substantially changed both rules, although it has
generated considerable confusion in the process. See also Douglas G. Baird & Robert
Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1222 (1982);
Barron & Dunfee, supra note 29, at 177-79.
71. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1990).
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contract formed by offer and acceptance are those of the offer, but some
terms from the acceptance may be included as well.' The rule that terms
from the acceptance may be included is then subject to four qualifications:
(i) "Different" terms of the acceptance are excluded.73 An "additional"
term is included only if (ii) the offer does not "expressly limitol acceptance
to the terms of the offer,"74 (iii) the term does not "materially alter" the
contract,75 and (iv) the offeror fails to manifest an objection to the term.76
The distinction in subsection (1) between acceptances and confirmations,
which apparently produces no difference in treatment under that subsec-
tion,7 may play a role under subsection (2).78 Subsection (3), finally,
creates a single rule that contrasts sharply with those of subsection (2): the
72. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1990). See generally Brown, supra note 25. But see Wladis,
supra note 28, at 1042-44.
73. This point is the subject of controversy. The exclusion of different terms is the
clear implication of the text of subsection (2), which, unlike subsection (1), omits any
reference to different terms. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1990). For Brown's explanation of the
reason for the omission, see infra text accompanying note 120. Summers supports the view
that the subsection refers only to additional terms. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 1-3,
at 34-35. Wladis argues that the drafting history supports this view. Wladis, supra note 28,
at 1050.
Comment 3 to § 2-207 indicates, however, that different terms may be incorporated
in the agreement: "Whether or not additional or different terms will become part of the
agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection (2)." U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3 (1990).
Murray summarizes the arguments pro and con, siding with Comment 3. Murray, Solutions,
supra note 64, at 1354-65. "[Ihe failure to include 'different' terms in subsection (2) would
emasculate the subsection's purpose...." Id. at 1365. If Murray is correct, however, the
result is simply a change in one aspect of Professor Brown's model. See infra text
accompanying note 120. For an argument that the omission of the word "different" from the
statutory text is the result of a printer's error, see John L. Utz, More on the Battle of the
Forms: The Treatment of "Different" Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 UCC
L.J. 103, 110-12 (1983).
74. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a) (1990).
75. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (1990).
76. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c) (1990).
77. According to Brown, "[t]he purpose of the inclusion of confirmations in subsection
(1) was to clarify that a confirmation inconsistent with the terms of the agreed contract does
not negate contractual intent." Brown, supra note 25, at 940-41. For further clarification,
see Wladis, supra note 28, at 1038-39.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 104-40.
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terms of a contract established by conduct are those on which the documents
agree and those "incorporated" under other Code provisions.79
The rules of section 2-207, particularly those of subsection (2), require
explanation. If neither party has signed or otherwise expressly manifested
agreement to the terms of the other's document, it is unclear by what means
the offeree has agreed to the terms of the offer, and by what means the
offeror has agreed to some terms of the acceptance.' The mystery is all
the greater because the terms of the documents, which may be boilerplate,
apparently trump terms implied from course of performance, course of
dealing, or usage of trade; the section actively encourages courts to draw
terms from form documents with little or no investigation of commercial
context.8'
The section's semantics are also problematical. The drafters used the
undefined term "assent" in subsection (1), and spoke throughout the section
of the terms of the "contract" rather than those of the "agreement." The
reference to assent suggests that something other than agreement is intended,
thus directing courts away from, rather than toward the bargain in fact. And
the references to the contract disguise most effectively the role, if any, of
that bargain in establishing the parties' total legal obligation.'
79. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1990).
80. See Myron Kove, "The Battle of the Forms": A Proposalto Revise Section 2-207,
3 UCC L.J. 7, 9 (1970).
81. The "proviso" of subsection (1), which provides that an acceptance is ineffective
if it is "expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms," U.C.C.
§ 2-207(1) (1990), compounds the problem. It invites courts to treat apparent acceptances
as ineffective to create agreements if they contain form provisions that track its language.
For a case in which the court concluded that form language was ineffective because it did not
track the proviso closely enough, see Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161,
1167-68 (6th Cir. 1972).
82. Professor Speidel, the Reporter for revised Article 2, has rightly criticized the
reference to intention to contract in existing section 2-204(3):
The phrase "intended to make a contract" in ... § 2-204(3) is an unfortunate
selection of words since it suggests that the parties must intend their
agreement to have legal consequences. Whether the parties ever intend this
is extremely doubtful. The real question is whether the agreement has
proceeded to such a point that no further negotiations are contemplated before
performance can commence.
Speidel, supra note 14, at 830 n.28 (citations omitted). The most recent draft version of
revised § 2-204 nevertheless refers to the parties' intention that their agreement be "sufficient
to make a contract for sale." July 1994 Draft Revision, supra note 7, at 11. And the most
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The comments to the section, whose role is presumably to resolve
confusion introduced in its text,' only make matters worse. Comments 4
and 5 indicate that the test for inclusion in the contract of terms proposed in
the acceptance is unfair surprise: a term is included if it will not produce
unfair surprise but excluded if it will.' This test is inappropriate for two
reasons. First, it fails to resolve the mystery of the section. It suggests, but
by no means makes clear, that the absence of unfair surprise is equivalent to
agreement. And second, it generates confusion about the section's role
within Article 2. Cases decided under the section often focus on breakdown
terms in sellers' documents, such as disclaimers of warranty or of liability
for buyers' consequential damages.' Each of these terms is subject to
review for unfair surprise under a specific Code section-the former under
section 2-3161 and the latter under section 2-719(3).' Moreover, each
may be subject to additional review for unconscionability-a concept that
incorporates the notion of unfair surprise-under section 2-302.88 This dual
structure invites courts to distinguish among two or more levels or kinds of
unfair surprise to avoid redundant analysis.8 9 Section 2-207 evidently
requires yet another distinction, but nothing in Article 2 tells courts what
recent draft version of § 2-207 nevertheless speaks of "assent" and of "contract" terms. Id.
at 13.
83. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 12-14. For highly skeptical
discussion of the comments to § 2-207, see Letter from Grant Gilmore to Robert S. Summers,
supra note 32, reprinted in, SPEIDEL ET AL., supra note 32, at 514.
84. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmts. 4, 5 (1990).
85. E.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 96 (3d Cir.
1991) (disclaimer of warranties); Hydraform Prod. Corp. v. American Steel & Aluminum
Corp., 498 A.2d 339,343-45 (N.H. 1985) (disclaimer of liability for consequential damages).
86. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3) (1990); id. cmt. 1.
87. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1990); WHITE &SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 12-11, at529-31.
88. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990).
89. With respect to disclaimers of warranty, see generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 13, § 12-11, at 532-38; Michael J. Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied
Warranty Disclaimers, 62 CHI. KNT L. REv. 199 (1985). With respect to disclaimers of
liability for consequential damages, see generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 12-
11, at 530-32. With respect to both, see generally Special Project, Article Two Warranties
in Commercial Transactions:An Update, 72 CORNELL L. Rv. 1159, 1292-1301 (1987). For
criticism of the structure of the Code, see Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the
Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 516-28 (1967).
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level or kind of unfair surprise the drafters reserved for the section.' ° If its
subject is unfair surprise, then, the section's very presence in the Code is at
odds with the simplicity and clarity that Llewellyn sought.
C. Proposed Section 2-204
Proposed section 2-204 provides as follows:
§ 2-204. Formation and Terms in General.
(a) Parties may make an agreement for sale in any manner
sufficient to show that they have intended to enter into a bargain,
including conduct by both that recognizes the existence of a bargain.
(b) Parties may make an agreement for sale even though:
(1) the moment of its making is undetermined; or
(2) one or more terms are not agreed upon, if there is
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.
(c) If one party proposes a term, the other party may agree to
the term either expressly or by implication. Implied agreement exists
if the term corresponds to an applicable course of performance, course
of dealing, or usage of trade.
The proposed section improves upon the existing combination of sections
2-207 and 2-204 in at least four ways. First, the elimination of section
2-207 indicates that cases of additional or different terms are not subject to
a special set of rules. The proposed section emphasizes this point by treating
these cases as a subset of the larger set of cases in which the parties have
apparently failed to reach agreement on all terms.9 Article 2's basic
formation section now governs the entire set of cases. The applicability of
the section, moreover, does not depend on the use of a standard form
document of sale.
90. For one court's solution to the problem in the context of a disclaimer of liability
for consequential damages, see Hydraform Prod. Corp. v. American Steel & Aluminum
Corp., 498 A.2d 339, 343 (N.H. 1985). Inquiry into unfair surprise under § 2-207(2)(b) led
to §§ 2-719(2), -719(3), which in turn led to § 2-302. Id. Resolution of the unfair surprise
issue under § 2-302 left open the issue of failure of essential purpose under § 2-719(2). Id.
91. Professors Baird and Weisberg believe that the original Code drafters sought, at
least in part, to accomplish this in drafting § 2-207. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 70, at
1221.
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Second, the proposed section sharpens the initial focus on actual
agreement by describing the parties as intending to enter into a bargain,
rather than as intending to create a contract. It maintains this focus
throughout by avoiding any reference to contract terms. Thus, any inquiry
into terms supplied by the Code will take place under other sections.
Third, any inquiry into terms deleted by the Code will also take place
under other sections; the proposed section simplifies and clarifies the Code
by focusing only on agreement and making no reference to unfair surprise.
The structure of the Code will emphasize that courts are not to merge the
two notions by treating the absence of unfair surprise as equivalent to
agreement. Indeed, the issue of unfair surprise will be irrelevant in any case
in which the court finds that there is no agreement to a proposed term.
Fourth, the proposed section should maximize contextual analysis.
The test for inclusion of a term that one party proposes is simply the other
party's agreement, either express or implied. Assume, for example, that
trade usage permits a seller of goods on credit to charge interest on amounts
due for more than thirty days, but not on amounts paid within thirty days.
The usage is part of the bargain between a buyer and a seller in the trade z
if neither proposes a term relating to interest. It is also part of the bargain
if, for example, the seller uses a document of sale that states that the buyer
will owe interest on only those amounts due for more than thirty days. The
buyer has agreed implicitly to the seller's proposed interest term.
Suppose, however, the seller uses a document of sale that purports to
change the usage-to let it charge interest on amounts due for more than ten
days rather than thirty. The provision relating to interest is a proposed term
to which the buyer may agree either expressly or by implication. If there is
no express agreement, the term will be part of the bargain if the parties'
course of performance or course of dealing overrides the trade usage. But
if there is no such course of performance or course of dealing, the seller will
not have succeeded in changing the term implied from the usage. This
approach takes seriously the "pre-agreed" status of terms and meanings
implied from transactional settings.93
92. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An
Economic Rationale for an Inflexible Rule, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 515 (1981).
93. See Task Force, A.B.A. Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk
Transfers, and Documents of Title, Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, An
Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article
2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 1019 (1991) [hereinafter Appraisal]. This does not
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I. Model Sales
Professor John Honnold observed recently that "legal science has not
yet found a satisfactory way to decide what the parties have 'agreed' when
they have consummated a transaction on the basis of the routine exchange of
inconsistent forms."I This state of affairs by no means reflects a lack of
effort on the part of the legal scientists who have written about the battle of
the forms.9' Yet the effort has been almost completely non-empirical. The
model that underlies section 2-207 and the competing models described in
the scholarly commentary are, in the main, ingeniously constructed castles
in the air, unsupported by substantial empirical evidence. They hover over
the Code, in profound conflict with Llewellyn's general methodology.
A. The Models Described
Four models emerge from the commentary. All four predate the
widespread use of computer technology in sales contracting, and all four thus
assume that the parties use paper documents of sale, with standard
breakdown terms printed in form language and performance terms filled in
for each transaction. All four also assume that the parties reach express
agreement on performance terms.
Three of the models are qualified in the sense that they describe both
typical and atypical transactions. In the first model, which underlies the
section, the typical buyer and seller give blanket assents to all or some of
each other's form breakdown terms. In the second, described by Dean John
Murray, Jr.,' the typical parties give blanket assents to the breakdown
mean that people in business must "adhere passively to the compulsory uniformity of behavior
imposed by tradition and custom," FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS 4 (1986), but
only that one party must obtain the other's agreement to innovate. Contra JOHN 0.
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION § 169 n.8 (2d ed. 1991). For more detailed discussion of the operation of
proposed § 2-204, see infra text accompanying notes 309-26.
94. HONNOLD, supra note 93, § 165, at 228.
95. See supra note 35.
96. Murray's articles are: A Proposed Revision of Section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 6 J.L. & COM. 337 (1986) [hereinafter Murray, Proposed Revision];
Solutions, supra note 64; The Article 2 Prism, supra note 44; Section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Another Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U. Prr'r. L. REV.
597 (1978); Realism, supra note 5; and Intention Over Terms: An Exploration of U.C.C.
2-207 and New Section 60, Restatement of Contracts, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 317 (1969).
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terms of Article 2. And in the third, described by Professor Hunter Taylor,
Jr.,' there are no blanket assents; any breakdown terms in the typical
agreement are implied from course of performance, course of dealing, or
usage of trade. In the fourth model, described by Professors Douglas Baird
and Robert Weisberg,9" the parties are responsive to the applicable law,
which might, if appropriately drafted, encourage them to reach agreement
on the terms of the last document sent.
1. The Section 2-207 Model: Professor Brown
In a subtle and thoughtful explication of section 2-207,19 Professor
Caroline Brown describes its underlying"m model.' 0' In the model,
which is remarkably intricate and detailed, the buyer and the seller of goods
are business firms," and an interest in efficient operation leads one or
both to use a form document of sale. 3 The effect of the form terms
depends on whether the document helps to form an agreement, serving as
Most recently, see John E. Murray, Jr., The Revision ofArticle 2: Romancing the Prism, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1447, 1464-81 (1994).
97. E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., U.C.C. Section 2-207: An Integration ofLegalAbstractions
and Transactional Reality, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 419 (1977).
98. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 70.
99. Brown, supra note 25.
100. For a report that no single model animated the various drafters of § 2-207, see
Letter from Grant Gilmore to Robert S. Summers, supra note 32, reprinted in, SPEIDEL, ET
AL., supra note 32, at 514. The argument that a model underlies the section does not mean,
however, that all participants in its drafting held the model in mind as they made their
contributions. It means only that the model explains the section's provisions.
101. Brown's only use of the term "model" is in observing that Article 2 eschews at least
some preconceptions of traditional contract doctrine. Brown, supra note 25, at 899.
Moreover, she "makes no effort to address the function of § 2-207 in all cases." Id. at 894
n.6. She argues, however, that "[tihe significance of a simple exchange of forms (or an
exchange of forms coupled with performance) must be determined in large part by rather
mechanical rules derived from the drafters' presumptions of what the parties expected." Id.
at 904. The rules make sense even though the section is badly drafted. Id. at 943. These
presumptions about expectations may not track the models of the common law, but they
constitute a model nevertheless.
102. Brown never makes this point explicit, but it is implicit in much of her discussion,
which emphasizes efficiency of business operation. E.g., id. at 922, 926.
103. Id. at 900, 903.
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either an offer or an acceptance, or confirms an agreement that the parties
have reached informally.
a. Offer and Acceptance
Brown focuses mainly on offer and acceptance, and assumes that in
most cases the buyer is the offeror.10" She describes both typical and
atypical agreements.
i. Typical Agreements
A seller that receives an offer on a form document examines
"carefully" its "filled-in" terms, which generally relate to performance.'"'
Moreover, Brown argues, the seller has "a natural opportunity and practical
incentive to examine" other parts of the offer,"° including its form
breakdown terms. Yet for reasons of efficiency, the seller simply sends a
form acceptance without reading the offer's breakdown terms. t07  The
buyer, on receiving the acceptance, does not read its breakdown terms,"°8
merely giving a "cursory glance at the few filled-in terms to verify the
impression that the [acceptance] signifies an agreement already conclud-
ed. "'9
Although the breakdown terms remain unread, the buyer's impression
is correct; the exchange of documents produces an agreement, and the
parties usually proceed with the transaction. " The terms of the agreement
are the performance terms on which the documents agree, the breakdown
terms of the offer, and the not unreasonable additional breakdown terms of
the acceptance.
The mechanism for the inclusion of unread breakdown terms is blanket
assent."' By sending a form offer, Brown contends, the offeror (1)
proposes that the offeree give a blanket assent to the offer's breakdown
104. Id. at 902.
105. Id. at 915.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 916.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 896-97, 903.
111. Id. at 916 n.108, 895.
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terms, and (2) gives the offeree latitude-indeed implicitly invites the
offeree-to add terms that "do not significantly alter the bargain proposed
in the offer.""' The invitation amounts to the offeror's advance blanket
assent to "any reasonable term [in the acceptance that is] not inconsistent
with the offer, no matter how important that term might be.""' The
notion of unfair surprise furnishes the outer limit of reasonableness, and thus
of blanket assent:" 4 the offeror's invitation does not include terms that the
offeror would be surprised to discover in the acceptance. "5
The notion of unfair surprise will exclude few of the offeree's
proposed terms, however. The offeror has the opportunity, in carefully
preparing its own form document, to address any subject it deems important.
This means that the offeror's silence on any subject strongly implies a
willingness to accept any term the offeree proposes on that subject; only an
occasional term in an acceptance will be unfairly surprising and therefore
excluded from the agreement." 6
Suppose, for example, an offer contains a form provision entitling the
buyer to consequential damages if the seller breaches, but omits any
provision relating to warranties. In Brown's view, the offeror (1) invites the
offeree to agree via blanket assent to the consequential damages provision,
and (2) agrees in advance to any not unfairly surprising provision relating to
warranties. Only a warranty term that "no reasonable person in the offeror's
position would anticipate the offeree providing" ' is excluded from the
offeror's invitatioh. By sending an acceptance, the offeree complies with
both of the offeror's requests, giving a blanket assent to the terms of the
offer," 8 including the consequential damages provision, and furnishing the
invited warranty provision. The harmonious result is agreement on both
consequential damages and warranties. Blanket assent thus puts an end to
the battle of the forms.
112. Id. at 928; see also id. at 905.
113. Id. at 929, 931.
114. Id. at 944.
115. Id. at 936.
116. Id. at 931.
117. Id. at 935.
118. Id. at 915-17. This assent does not include terms that are proposed in bad faith or
that are unconscionable. Id. at 937-40.
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Brown's description of the typical agreement explains the rules of
section 2-207(2)-the main source of the section's mystery. The offeree's
blanket assent explains the basic rule that the offer supplies the initial set of
breakdown terms. And the offeror's implicit invitation explains both the
general rule that breakdown terms from the acceptance may enter the
agreement," 9 and the four qualifications of that rule. Because the offeror
does not invite the offeree to supply terms that conflict with those of the
offer, (i) "different"-as opposed to "additional"-terms in the acceptance
do not become part of the agreement. 20 Because any offeror may decline
to extend an implicit invitation, (ii) even additional terms in the acceptance
are excluded if the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer. 121 Because the offeror's implicit invitation extends only to reason-
able terms in the acceptance, (iii) material alterations are not part of the
agreement.1' And because an offeror may limit the invitation it extends,
(iv) an objection to a particular term in the acceptance will exclude that
term." An offeree's disclaimer of warranties, for example, will become
part of the agreement under the general rule of subsection (2) if it does not
run afoul of one of these four qualifications.
ii. Atypical Agreements
Brown recognizes that a seller may respond to an offer with a
counteroffer rather than an acceptance. 24 The seller may, for example,
tell the buyer's purchasing agent that a form acceptance is intended to serve
119. Id. at 929.
120. Id. at 930-32. If Murray is correct that different terms may become part of the
agreement under § 2-207(2), see supra note 73, Brown's model requires a minor adjustment:
the offeror's implicit invitation includes terms that conflict with those of the offer, but only
if the requirements of subsection (2) are met. Thus the offer must not expressly limit
acceptance to the terms of the offer, U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a) (1990), the terms must not
materially alter the agreement, id. § 2-207(2)(b), and the offeror must not give notice of
objection to the terms. Id. § 2-207(2)(c).
121. Brown, supra note 25, at 929.
122. Id. at 929-30. Brown emphatically rejects the view that the baseline for assessing
the materiality of an alteration is the set of terms that Article 2 provides. Id. at 936-37.
123. Id. at 929.
124. Id. at 907.
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 599 (1994)
this function, 'I or the performance terms of the acceptance may differ in
an important way from those of the offer."6 If the offeror then performs,
it has agreed to the terms of the counteroffer. Section 2-207 does not supply
a rule that tracks this set of expectations, Brown contends, and the case
should therefore be disposed of under the common law of contracts. 27
Where the parties do business with form documents, however, the
offeree's dispatch of a response usually signifies acceptance of the offer."
Brown argues that courts should "rarely if ever" find a counteroffer solely
on the basis of "the offeree's inclusion of a preprinted proviso in an ordinary
form where the filled-in portions match the offeror's proposal."'29 As a
result, section 2-207 will govern in most cases.
It is also possible for a seller to send a document that is ambigu-
ous-neither an acceptance nor a counteroffer. The document might, for
example, contain a form proviso "highlighted by color, typeface, or
location"-arguably ambiguous if form language commonly goes un-
read. '3 If this occurs, Brown writes, the document has "no ... ascertain-
able positive legal effect."' If the parties then perform, their conduct
furnishes "the only evidence that they have made an agreement." 3 2 And
the terms on which they have agreed are evidently limited to those on which
the documents coincide-in many cases probably only the performance
terms.33  Section 2-207(3) governs, and the parties' expectations are
consistent with the rule of that subsection: the terms of the contract are those
125. Id. at 916 n.106; see also id. at 922.
126. Id. at 912.
127. Id. at919. See generally id. at917-19. Because § 2-207 does not apply inthecase
of a counteroffer, the common law remains applicable under § 1-103. U.C.C. § 1-103
(1990).
128. Brown, supra note 25, at 921.
.129. Id. at 923. A "proviso" is a provision that tracks the last clause of § 2-207(l).
U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1990); see Brown, supra note 25, at 897 n.13; supra note 81; see also
Brown, supra note 25, at 897, 907, 921.
130. Brown, supra note 25, at 926.
131. Id. at 926.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 927.
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on which the writings agree and "supplementary terms incorporated under
any other provisions of [the Code]."1
b. Confirmations
If the parties make an informal agreement that one or both of them
later confirms with a form document, Brown observes that neither party is
the offeror, and therefore neither's document furnishes an initial set of
terms."'35 The terms of the agreement undoubtedly include those agreed on
informally. 6 They also include those on which the confirmations agree.
If a confirmation includes a not unreasonable term and the recipient of the
confirmation remains silent on the subject, that term will become part of the
agreement.3 7  If, on the other hand, the term contradicts a term in a
confirmation sent by the recipient, the contradictory terms "knock" each
other out, and neither becomes part of the agreement.'
Brown's discussion of confirmations does not explain any feature of
the text of section 2-207(2). The "knock-out" component of her model,
however, explains the "knock-out" rule of Comment 6:
Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict each
party must be assumed to object to a clause of the other conflicting with
one on the confirmation sent by himself. As a result the requirement that
there be notice of objection which is found in subsection (2) is satisfied
and the conflicting terms do not become a part of the contract."'
134. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1990); Brown, supra note 25, at 927-28.
135. Brown, supra note 25, at 941.
136. This conclusion is implicit in Brown's argument that a term in a confirmation that
conflicts with one in the informal agreement is a "different" term. Id.
137. Id. at 941; U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6 (1990). Brown does not argue explicitly that
blanket assent operates in the area of confirmations as it does in the area of offers and
acceptances. If the recipient has sent its own form confirmation, it has probably invited the
other party to respond with reasonable, noncontradictory terms. This argument applies with
less force, if any, where the recipient has not sent its own confirmation. Perhaps the
opportunity to send a confirmation means that the recipient's silence supplies the requisite
invitation.
138. Brown, supra note 25, at 942.
139. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 6 (1990).
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In cases of offer and acceptance, of course, blanket assent makes this rule
inapplicable. 4
c. Implied Terms and Blanket Assent
Regardless of whether the parties' documents function as offer and
acceptance or as confirmations, terms implied from course of performance,
course of dealing, and usage of trade play a rather limited role in the model
Brown depicts. An express term of the offer that becomes part of the
agreement via the offeree's blanket assent presumably trumps any contrary
implied term under the qualified hierarchy the Code drafters provided. 4'
And an express term in the acceptance to which the offeror has given
advance blanket assent presumably has the same effect. 42
The existence of an implied term can make a form term in the
acceptance unreasonable, and thus lead to its exclusion as a material
alteration. 43 This may occur, for example, if the form term directly
contradicts the implied term. Yet the breadth of the offeror's implicit
invitation means that the form term will usually be included.'"
Although Brown makes the case for blanket assent to the terms of the
offer and some terms of the acceptance, she does not say explicitly that the
employees who arrange sales give that assent, or even realize that it takes
place. She suggests, indeed, that the Code drafters adopted the notion of
blanket assent because it produced an appropriate compromise: "The Code
140. See supra notes 104-23 and accompanying text. Summers agrees with Brown on
this point, but White disagrees. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 1-3, at 33-34.
141. U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1990); see supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
142. Brown does indicate that if a course of dealing or a usage of trade exists and the
offer is silent on the subject, the offeror has not necessarily agreed to any term the offeree
may propose. The offer's silence may, for example, reflect the fact that a usage is recognized
so clearly in the trade that its mention appeared unnecessary. Brown's argument implies that
the offeree's term becomes part of the agreement if (1) it "is common enough in the industry
or in transactions between the two parties to negate the possibility of the offeror's surprise,"
and (2) it "is not inconsistent with expectations created by the parties' prior dealings."
Brown, supra note 25, at 936. This notion translates into a "light' burden for the offeree,
and thus the express term in the acceptance should prevail in most cases. Jd.
143. Id. at 935.
144. See supra note 142. This applies literally only to offer and acceptance; Brown's
article includes no discussion of the relation between implied terms and form terms in
confirmations. Yet presumably the material alteration analysis remains the same.
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balances, on the one hand, the need to give effect to commercial expectations
created by the common exchange of unread forms with the need, on the
other hand, to give some effect to the forms' preprinted terms, perhaps to
justify the expense and effort of their drafting." 45
The basis of Brown's model, then, is blanket assent-a notion that did
not necessarily reflect commercial reality even in the minds of the Code
drafters. Brown does envision some atypical transactions, and she acknowl-
edges that the notion of unfair surprise and the Code concepts of good faith
and unconscionability will render some form terms unenforceable. Yet in
the typical case, blanket assent means that the court will be able to draw
most, if not all, of the breakdown terms from the form provisions in the
documents of sale.
2. Alternative Models
Other commentators on section 2-207 have generally agreed with the
description of the parties"4 and their business routines that Brown pres-
ents. Most assume, for example, that the buying and selling firms use one-
sided documents and that sales personnel almost never read form terms. 47




In a comprehensive and detailed series of articles,"¢ Murray bases
his view of the battle of the forms'49 on his conception of the "underlying
145. Brown, supra note 25, at 927; see also id. at 904.
146. The commentators assume not only that the parties are usually business firms, but
also that a firm has the resources to obtain legal advice. See, e.g., Barron & Dunfee, supra
note 29, at 174; Travalio, supra note 28, at 365, 371-73, 378.
147. See, e.g., Barron & Dunfee, supra note 29, at 173-75; Murray, Proposed
Revision, supra note 96, at 345-46; Corneill A. Stephens, On Ending the Battle of the Forms:
Problems With Solutions, 80 KY. L.J. 815, 815-16, 818-19 (1991-92); Travalio, supra note
28, at 329-33.
148. See supra note 96.
149. Murray uses the term "model" not to describe his conception of the agreements
parties make using form documents of sale, but rather to describe the unduly narrow approach
of the common law. Murray, Realism, supra note 5, at 289. Yet his view of the proper
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philosophy of Article 2. "15° The crux of his argument is that the typical
party that receives a document of sale gives a blanket assent 15' to only
those of its form terms that match the "specific normative assumptions of
Article 2"-assumptions that are embodied in the Article's standard terms.
These standard terms include "express and implied warranties and all judicial
remedies to protect the fundamental expectation interests of the parties. "1
52
Thus, the typical buyer does not give a blanket assent to a seller's disclaimer
of Code warranties, and the disclaimer remains outside the agreement. 53
The normative component in Murray's argument verges on domi-
nance. He regards the standard terms of Article 2 as balanced and fair;
although warranties protect the buyer, for example, the right of cure protects
the seller. 54  And the Article "not only enables but directs courts to
impose their understanding of commercial morality on the market
place. "'55
Yet Murray's emphasis on norms coexists with an emphasis on judicial
discovery of the agreement. The underlying philosophy of Article 2 "may
be stated as a more precise and fair identification of the factual bargain of
the parties,' ' 156 and the courts' "task is to approximate, as closely as the
objective evidence permits, the 'true understanding' of the parties. '1
7
interpretation of § 2-207 clearly rests on a set of assumptions about the parties' agreement,
and these assumptions constitute a model. See infra text accompanying notes 151-75.
150. See Murray, Proposed Revision, supra note 96, at 339-40; Murray, Solutions,
supra note 64, at 1311, 1372-85.
151. Most of Murray's discussion of § 2-207 concerns the proper interpretation of the
section, and he generally focuses on the notion of unfair surprise rather than the notion of
blanket assent per se. See, e.g., Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1354-65. Yet he
clearly endorses the notion of blanket assent. Id. at 1376.
152. Id. at 1374; see also id. at 1377 (adding "statute of limitations, reasonable time,
place, and manner of performance, and other normative assumptions"); Murray, Realism,
supra note 5, at 279.
153. Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1377.
154. See Murray, Proposed Revision, supra note 96, at 353; Murray, Solutions, supra
note 64, at 1377.
155. Murray, The Article 2 Prism, supra note 44, at 20; see also id. at 19.
156. Murray, Proposed Revision, supra note 96, at 340. In an earlier formulation, this
philosophy was "a more precise andfair identification of the actual orpresumedassentofthe
parties." Murray, Realism, supra note 5, at 276.
157. Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1313.
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There is no tension between precision and fairness because the commercial
morality of normal buyers and sellers tracks the commercial morality of the
Article, and the terms of the normal agreement match the standard terms of
the Article.' Thus, the normal parties give blanket assents to those
standard terms.
ii. Atypical Agreements
In a given transaction, one or both of the parties may wish to deviate
from a standard term of Article 2. Clear communication of this intention
will make the agreement atypical. The test for clear communication is
commercial reasonableness; the question is whether a reasonable party would
understand the other's intention to deviate from the Article 2 terms. 59 A
printed form document may pass the test in a particular case."' Enforce-
ment of a form term in the absence of clear communication, however, will
produce an unfairly surprising departure from the standard Article 2
terms. '
6'
If an offer is the vehicle for clear communication of an intention to
deviate from the standard terms, the understanding of the offeree is that the
relevant term of the response must match that of the offer for the response
to function as an acceptance. 6 2 An offeror may, for example, demand that
the parties resolve any of their disputes by arbitration. If the response to the
offer also calls for arbitration, there is an agreement that requires use of the
procedure, even though it deviates from the standard terms of Article 2.
If the relevant term of the response is not the same, however, the
response is an ineffective acceptance-simply a refusal to make a bargain on
the offeror's terms-and there is no agreement. If the parties nevertheless
perform, their agreement consists only of the performance terms that match,
158. Murray, Proposed Revision, supra note 96, at 352-53; Murray, Solutions, supra
note 64, at 1351-52.
159. See Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, 1322-54; Murray, Realism, supra note 5,
at 281. On the issue of the recipient's understanding, "[tihe clarity of the language, its
conspicuousness and evidence of other means of communicating its meaning would be
relevant." Murray, Proposed Revision, supra note 96, at 359.
160. Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1384; Murray, Realism, supra note 5, at281.
161. See Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1374-76.
162. See id. at 1325-27.
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and the law must complete the contract by supplying the remaining
terms. 63 The absence of an arbitration provision in Article 2 means that
any disputes not settled informally will be resolved by litigation.
If the intention to deal only on the party's terms is communicated
clearly in a response to an offer," 4 on the other hand, the reasonable
understanding of the offeror is that the response is a counteroffer rather than
either an effective or an ineffective acceptance." An offeror that receives
a counteroffer and then performs thereby agrees to the terms of the
counteroffer, whether or not those terms match the standard terms of Article
2.11 Thus, if the seller is the party that wishes to arbitrate, it can require
the buyer to use the procedure by means of a counteroffer that the buyer
accepts by performing.
iii. Implied Terms
Murray stresses the importance of commercial context. 67 He
advocates an interpretation of section 2-207 in which offers include implied
terms for purposes of determining whether express terms in the acceptance
are "additional" or "different."'68 Offers also include implied terms for
the purpose of assessing the materiality of the alteration wrought by a term
in the acceptance.169 Where an implied term matches an Article 2 standard
term, it is part of the typical agreement.17 An implied term, moreover,
can control over a standard Article 2 term in at least some situations,'
7 1
thus making the transaction atypical even though there is no express
communication of intention to deviate from the standard terms of the
Article."
163. Id.
164. See id. at 1343-52.
165. Id. at 1325, 1328, 1335.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1313-14, 1361 n.209, 1383-84; Murray, Realism, supra note 5, at 289.
168. Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1362.
169. Id. at 1363.
170. Murray, Realism, supra note 5, at 281.
171. Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1361, 1377; Murray, Realism, supra note 5,
at 283.
172. Murray, Realism, supra note 5, at 283.
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Murray firmly believes, however, that Article 2 prohibits enforcement
of unfair commercial practices."7 In general, deviations "from the parties'
normal assumptions are frowned upon. '74 And given his view that Article
2 reaches a fair balance between buyer- and seller-oriented terms, this
disapproval extends logically to implied as well as express deviations ."
Thus, a practice that runs counter to a standard term is suspect at the very
least.
b. Professor Taylor
Taylor's rejection of blanket assent makes his model far less detailed
than either Brown's or Murray's. Indeed, were it not for his assumption that
typical sales agreements exist, his conception would not constitute a model,
but simply a call for an open-ended empirical inquiry.
i. Typical Agreements
Taylor envisions a typical agreement whose express terms relate only
to performance. 76  There are clearly some situations in which a term
173. Murray, The Article 2 Prism, supra note 44, at 19-20.
174. Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1374.
175. Murray recognizes, of course, that an agreement can be fair even if it contains a
deviant express term. A low price, for example, may compensate for a disclaimer of
warranties. Id. at 1327 n.83. Yet the express term remains deviant and thus frowned upon,
and Murray's articles furnish no reason for treating deviant implied terms differently.
176. Taylor, supra note 97, at 421, 425. Many other commentators agree. See, e.g.,
Barron & Dunfee, supra note 29, at 173-75,206-07; Mark E. Roszkowski, Ending the Battle
of the Forms: A Proposed Revision of UCC Section 2-207, 26 UCC L.J. 144 (1993);
Stephens, supra note 147, at 837 (departing from Taylor's model, however, by treating as
part of the agreement conspicuous terms that appear "on the first page of the [acceptance]");
Appraisal, supra note 93, at 1062; Travalio, supra note 28, at 329-31, 336-37 n.37, 355, 361-
62. One passage in Travalio's article suggests that he subscribes to Brown's version of
blanket assent. Id. at 353. The suggestion is merely that, however. The likelihood is,
rather, that each party's use of a form document reflects an intent to object to the other's
breakdown terms. Id. at 354; see also Thatcher, supra note 35; Charles M. Thatcher, Battle
of the Forms: Solution by Revision of Section 2-207, 16 UCC L.J. 237 (1984). Thatcher
writes that "Murray's thoughtful critique of Section 2-207 and the case law furnished most
of the insight and incentive for [his proposed revision of the section]." Id. at 246. His
proposed revision, however, appears consistent with Taylor's model; unlike Murray's, it
makes no reference to the standard terms of Article 2. Id. at 246-47; Thatcher, supra note
35, at 189-90. Professor Herbert's view of the agreement is generally consistent with
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implied from usage of trade or course of dealing is part of the agree-
ment.1 7 Where form provisions in the parties' documents "are identical
and ... consistent with trade, custom or past dealings between the parties"
the provisions may "properly be thought of as agreed to."'78 If the parties
have not expressly agreed-in a document or otherwise-on a particular
subject, any applicable course of dealing or trade usage will supply a term
on the subject.179 And where the buyer's order is silent on the subject and
the seller's acknowledgment agrees with the implied term, Taylor's
argument implies that the agreement incorporates the seller's term.'80
Thus, for example, if a trade usage limits the buyer's remedies for breach
of warranty to repair or replacement, the seller's form provision to that
effect is part of the agreement.
Where the form terms conflict and one coincides with an implied term,
Taylor favors giving effect to the one that coincides with the implied
term. 8 Given the remedy-limiting trade usage, for example, the seller's
provision will be effective even if the buyer's document includes a form
provision subjecting the seller to liability for consequential damages. Taylor
does not argue explicitly, however, that the term is part of the agreement;
it may instead be outside the agreement but included in the contract."8
Taylor's. See Michael J. Herbert, Contracts of Accretion: A Modest Proposalfor U. C. C.
Section 2-207, 14 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 441 (1984).
177. Taylor, supra note 97, at 437.
178. Id. at425 n.17.
179. Id. at 431-32.
180. Id. at 434-35.
181. This approach is generally consistent with that of proposed § 2-204. See supra
notes 92-93 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 309-26.
182. Enforcement of the express term that coincides with the implied term is appropriate
because it "fulfills the more reasonable of the two expectations." Taylor, supra note 97, at
437. If the parties' expectations are different, the term must be part of the contract but not
part of the agreement. The notion that the parties' expectations are different seems at odds
with Taylor's generalization about the lack of expectations on breakdown matters. He
suggests, however, one possible exception to that generalization: "To the extent that either
party has a precise expectation beyond obtaining performance from the other (e.g., payment
of money or delivery of goods), it is likely that each party believes that the contract has been
formed in accordance with the terms of its own form." Id. at 421.
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ii. Atypical Agreements
Form language in one party's document may occasionally displace a
term otherwise implied in the agreement. A provision in the buyer's
document may have that effect, for example, if "its presence in the buyer's
form is effectively and conspicuously communicated to the seller. '"" If
the provision is not conspicuous, however, its inclusion "would generally
produce a result not reasonably foreseeable by the seller.""
By the same token, a seller may type or handwrite a notation on a
form document that would be sufficiently conspicuous to place the buyer on
notice that the seller insisted on a particular term. If the buyer receives the
document and performs, the term should arguably be effective, presumably
as part of the agreement."i Yet Taylor has his doubts: "ordinarily more
should be required," he writes, since it is so easy for the seller to pick up the
telephone or send a telegram to initiate negotiation over the term."
c. Professors Baird and Weisberg
Most commentators on section 2-207 assume that counsel who prepare
form documents are familiar with the law, and in some instances incorporate
particular clauses that track parts of the section, such as the subsection (1)
proviso.187 Yet commentators, including Brown, do not argue that the
advent of the section produced any fundamental change in either document
preparation or contracting behavior. The assumption is that firms used one-
sided documents before section 2-207 became law and they continue to do
so today; sales personnel ignored one-sided provisions before the section
became law and they continue to do so today. Form documents may be
more prevalent today than they were under the common law, but commen-
tators relate the development to firm size and the need for efficiency rather
than to the enactment of the Code.
Baird and Weisberg, however, believe that contracting practices are
potentially responsive to the law. They agree that form language goes
183. Id. at 436-37.
184. Id. at 437.
185. Id. at 440-41.
186. Id. at 441, 447.
187. E.g., Brown, supra note 25, at 920 n.127; Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at
1337-41.
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unread under section 2-207, but argue that an appropriate change in the law
might stimulate some parties to read form provisions. If courts reestablished
and strictly enforced the "last shot" rule, buyers, which usually submit
offers, would realize that performance would bind them to the terms of
sellers' acceptances.' At least some buyers would therefore read the
form terms on the acceptances and "take their business elsewhere" if the
terms were unacceptable." s This would encourage sellers generally "to
design the terms in [their form documents] in the mutual interest of the
parties. '' 190
Baird and Weisberg thus describe a model in which the few buyers and
sellers that are willing to devote time to reading form language in effect
represent those that are not. Negotiation by these few, rather than blanket
assent by all, produces fair terms and an end to the battle of the forms.' 9'
188. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 70, at 1257.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. The authors describe two conditions that must be met if this is to occur. First, a
sufficient number of buyers must read form terms. Based upon the work of Beale and
Dugdale, see infra note 194 and accompanying text, and upon studies that "[suggest] that
fixed printed terms in sellers' warranties conform to buyers' preferences even in consumer
transactions," Baird and Weisberg regard it as "quite plausible" that this condition "will be
met." Baird & Weisberg, supra note 70, at 1258. Second, however, courts must be willing
to enforce the last shot rule strictly, and on this score the authors have their doubts. Courts
are generally unwilling "to enforce formal rules of contract formation," id. at 1259, and they
did not enforce the mirror image rule strictly before § 2-207 became law. Id. at 1233-37.
Doubts about strict enforcement of the last shot rule lead Baird and Weisberg to raise
the possibility of a "slightly narrower version" of the rule, to be couched in statutory terms:
LEGENDED ACCEPTANCE
A merchant seller may respond to a merchant buyer's offer with a
writing that bears the legend: "WARNING: Seller will only contract on the
basis of the terms set forth in this document and no other. Acceptance of the
goods constitutes acceptance of the terms set forth on this document."
This document must be sent 10 days before the goods are shipped.
The legend must be conspicuous, it must be in at least 16-point type, and it
must be in a color different from the rest of the document. If the seller
employs such a document and the goods are delivered and accepted, a contract
shall exist and the terms in the seller's legended acceptance shall constitute the
terms of the contract.
Id. at 1260.
Courts might be more likely to enforce the last shot rule if it applied only to
acceptances that bore this legend. Yet even in this limited form, the last shot rule is
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3. Summary
Although the four models vary in their depth of detail, each has a
central, distinguishing feature. Brown's model rests on the notion of blanket
assent to the terms of the offer and the not unfairly surprising additional
terms of the acceptance, and Murray's rests on the notion of blanket assent
to the standard terms of Article 2. In Taylor's model, the typical transaction
does not involve blanket assent, and in the Baird and Weisberg model the
transaction is responsive to the applicable law.
B. The Empirical Evidence
1. The Record
Commentators on section 2-207 have cited a limited record of
empirical data regarding the agreements that issue from the battle of the
forms. The record consists essentially of a few accounts of first-hand
investigations, 92 notably Murray's; Professor Stewart Macaulay's classic
1963 article titled Non-Contractual Relations in Business; 9 a 1975 article
by Professors Hugh Beale and Tony Dugdale on their interviews with
"representatives of nineteen firms of [English] engineering manufactur-
ers"; 9 and the 1990 report of an ABA Task Force on electronic data
conducive to artificial analysis, both because it employs the concepts of offer and acceptance,
see HONNOLD, supra note 93, § 132.1; Herbert, supra note 176; Murray, Solutions, supra
note 64, at 1366-72; Roszkowski, supra note 176, at 152-55, and because it apparently
applies only where the buyer is the offeror. Courts are likely to manipulate the concepts of
offer and acceptance in order to bring transactions within the rule if they wish to enforce the
seller's form provisions, or to make the rule inapplicable if they do not wish to enforce those
provisions.
192. There is, of course, a considerable body of reported case law on § 2-207. The
value of the case reports as a source of data is limited greatly, however, by the fact that the
courts' inquiries into agreement are often superficial at best. See infra notes 329-59 and
accompanying text. For analysis of some of the cases, see White, supra note 10, at 32-38.
White notes that the transactions that gave rise to the cases "are much more varied and
complex" than those described in the comments to § 2-207. Id. at 34.
193. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
194. Hugh Beale & Tony Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the
Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRrr. J.L. & Soc'Y 45, 46 (1975).
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interchange between business firms.' Baird and Weisberg cite the Beale
and Dugdale study as "suggestive" of the notion that at least some parties
read form language and "are aware of the legal consequences of documents
that differ."
96
The record depicts commercial behavior that is strikingly varied.
Brown, for example, found that "actual commercial practice involving the
use of forms is quite disparate and difficult to generalize about, except for
a few fundamental observations. "'" Variety characterizes both the
agreement formation procedures sales employees follow and the employees'
conceptions of the terms of the resulting agreements. And these formation
procedures, and perhaps conceptions of terms, are changing substantially in




Macaulay found that form provisions tended to be located on the back
of a document of sale, and that they were often "lengthy and printed in small
type."198 A seller's acknowledgement of an order "[t]ypically ... [would]
have ten to 50 paragraphs favoring the seller, and these provisions [were]
likely to be different from or inconsistent with the buyer's provisions." 99
Beale and Dugdale report a similar finding: "the majority of contracts were
made by each party using his 'back of order' conditions. "2I1
Not all of the firms in Macaulay's sample, however, used one-sided
form documents. Smaller firms were less likely to engage in this form of
195. ElectronicMessaging Services Task Force, The Commercial UseofElectronicData
Interchange-A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645 (1990)
[hereinafter EDI Report].
196. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 70, at 1219 n.5. The Beale and Dugdale study is
"merely suggestive" because it involved only 19 firms. Id. at 1254 n.87.
197. Brown, supra note 25, at 894 n.6.
198. Macaulay, supra note 193, at 58.
199. Id. at 59; see also Travalio, supra note 28, at 376.
200. Beale & Dugdale, supra note 194, at 49; see id. at 53-54 (conflict over late
delivery); id. at 56 (conflict over warranties and remedies).
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"standardized planning." 201 Brown found that "[s]ome forms lack[ed] any
fine print at all; some [had] copious amounts."' And Beale and Dugdale
report that some firms made agreements without using any form docu-
ments .203
Most data indicate that sales personnel focus almost exclusively on
performance terms in arranging routine transactions. Murray spoke "with
more than 5,000 purchasing agents, over a period of more than a decade,"
without finding "one purchasing manager who read printed terms," and
discovered that "when the purchasing agents were asked to explain a printed
term from their own purchase order forms, they could not do so. '"I
Macaulay's study also showed that purchasing agents generally ignored form
language on the documents they received.'0 Beale and Dugdale were
often "told that the other party's [form provisions] would be scruti-
nized, "2I but also found that in the battle of the forms the parties generally
seemed unconcerned over the conflict between form provisions. 7
Macaulay's interviews revealed that sales employees usually assumed
that differences between form provisions did not prevent parties from
reaching enforceable agreements." Beale and Dugdale found, however,
that "[t]here was considerable awareness of the fact that in many cases an
exchange of [conflicting form provisions] would not necessarily lead to an
enforceable contract."'  In general, the authors observed a "gradual
change in attitude towards tightening up procedures and creating legally
enforceable agreements. "210 Several of their interviewees said that this
change was "the result of a new professionalism among young managers,
many of whom [had] studied contract law."2 ' In some instances, the
201. Macaulay, supra note 193, at 58.
202. Brown, supra note 25, at 894 n.6.
203. Beale & Dugdale, supra note 194, at 48-49.
204. Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1317 n.47; see also Barron & Dunfee, supra
note 29, at 175 n.14.
205. Macaulay, supra note 193, at 59.
206. Beale & Dugdale, supra note 194, at 50.
207. Id. at 54, 56.
208. Macaulay, supra note 193, at 59.
209. Beale & Dugdale, supra note 194, at 50.
210. Id. at 51.
211. Id.
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change eliminated the battle of the forms; firms began to negotiate "standing
supply contracts to govern future orders."2"2
Murray found that "the typical purchasing agent [had] no under-
standing of the agreement process (e.g., whether a 'quote' is an offer), and
[did] not identify his or her company as offeror or offeree."213 Brown's
investigation revealed that "[a]lmost any form from a purchase order to an
acknowledgement to an invoice [could] be used as the original or sole
communication," and that, in general, a form document was more likely to
serve as a confirmation than as either an offer or an acceptance.1 4 A
purchasing agent employed by "a division of one of the largest manufactur-
ing corporations in the United States" told Macaulay that the corporation had
sufficient bargaining power to force its suppliers to sign and return its form
purchase orders, but that in doing so the suppliers often enclosed their own
form acknowledgements, which contained "conflicting provisions." The
agent would keep the signed purchase order and throw away the acknowl-
edgment.
215
ii. Terms of the Agreement
Of sixteen sales managers Macaulay interviewed, "[n]ine said that
frequently no agreement was reached on which set of fine print was to
govern."21 6 Some of Beale and Dugdale's interviewees thought the terms
of the last document sent "might prevail, "217 but the authors' account
suggests that this was an impression of what the courts would do rather than
of the parties' understanding.2 8
Beale and Dugdale found considerable evidence of implied terms.
Most of these related to performance, 21 9 but some related to breakdowns.
An "unwritten law," for example, required a seller to notify the buyer "in
212. Id.
213. Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1317-18 n.47; see also id. at 1350 n.162;
Murray, Proposed Revision, supra note 96, at 351.
214. Brown, supra note 25, at 894 n.6.
215. Macaulay, supra note 193, at 59.
216. Id.
217. Beale & Dugdale, supra note 194, at 50.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 51 (payment term is "net monthly account").
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advance of any likely delay" in delivery.' Another limited the seller's
liability to the cost of repair or replacement of defective goods." "[A]II
sellers said that in some circumstances they would repair or replace a
defective product outside the warranty period."'
Beale and Dugdale did not find, however, that buyers and sellers had
modified their one-sided documents to incorporate these implied terms.
Indeed, there was a "positive resistance to the idea."' Preservation of
flexibility provided a possible explanation: "It seem[ed] probable that these
customs were felt to operate more satisfactorily and flexibly in a purely
commercial context than they would in the formal context of legal rights and
duties. "I Professors Lon Fuller and Melvin Eisenberg suggest a different
reason for the lack of balanced form documents in the United States: "An
inquiry addressed to about forty trade associations reveal[ed] that the factor
which most inhibit[ed] the development of recommended standard forms
[lay] in a fear that the anti-trust laws [might] be interpreted to prohibit this
kind of cooperative rationalization of business practice. "I
The purchasing agents Murray interviewed had "at least a visceral
reaction to 'indecent' terms," as well as a "clear sense of their 'commercial
understanding.' "'  Moreover, "[w]hen informed of the 'normative
assumptions of Article 2,'. . . [they] suggest[ed] an identity between those
assumptions and their 'commercial understanding."" This understanding
was inchoate, however:
[The agents did] not understand the concept of warranty (e.g.,
that the implied warranty of merchantability [might] be highly
preferable to the typical warranty of repair or replacement
preferred by the [seller]). They not only [had] no understanding
of disclaimers of warranties; they [had] no concept of buyer or
seller remedies or, a fortiori, consequential damages. They
220. Id. at 54.
221. Id. at 56.
222. Id. at 57.
223. Id. at 59.
224. Id.
225. FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 65, at 603.
226. Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1318 n.47.
227. Id.
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typically [did] not know what arbitration is unless they [had]
been involved in that process. 8
Even when there was apparent express agreement on breakdown
terms, Macaulay found that parties generally treated the express "terms" as
irrelevant if something went wrong. 9  Thus, disregard for writings was
apparently common, and compromise and informal dispute resolution were
the norm.?0 One-sided provisions might, however, prove useful in the
process of negotiating a settlement.2t
Beale and Dugdale found that sellers at times went to court to collect
liquidated damages when buyers failed to pay, but also that sellers used legal
procedures only for a "serious bad debt problem," and that "the problem of
bad debts was very small. "2 The authors' findings are generally consis-
tent with Macaulay's report that buyers that cancelled orders expected to
reimburse sellers only for their expenses. 3 Although English law entitled
buyers to consequential damages for late delivery, "it appeared that such
consequential losses were seldom claimed and almost never paid. "I
Buyers seldom sought to enforce liquidated damages clauses in fully
negotiated agreements.' In the area that apparently most often produced
disputes-the quality of the goods-"resort to formal dispute settlement
procedures was rare. "236
228. Id. The comparison between the implied warranty of merchantability and the
"warranty of repair or replacement" is misleading; the former is a warranty and the latter is
a remedy. Compare U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1990) with id. § 2-719(1)(a).
229. Macaulay, supra note 193, at 61.
230. Id. For a generally consistent account, see Thomas J. McCarthy, An Introduction:
The Commercial Irrelevancy of the "Battle of the Forms," 49 Bus. LAW. 1019, 1026-27
(1994).
231. See 2 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 173 (1993).
232. Beale & Dugdale, supra note 194, at 51.
233. Some reimbursements included a component of lost profits, but in at least some
cases that component appeared to be "induced more by commercial convenience in calculating
costs than by awareness of contractual rights." Id. at 53.
234. Id. at 54.
235. See id. at 55.
236. Id. at 58.
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b. Computer Technology
i. Formation Procedures
The widespread and growing use of computer technology in buying
and selling goods is changing formation procedures in at least two ways.
First, it is changing the documents. Baird and Weisberg wondered as early
as 1982 whether "in an era of word processing the unquestioning distinction
between typewritten terms and nondickered terms in fine print [could]
persist. " 7 Both software and printers now permit firms to generate their
own documents of sale. Each purchase order or acknowledgment may be
custom-printed, 8 with no difference in typeface or color between perfor-
mance and breakdown terms.
This method of document production challenges the traditional
distinction between form and nonform terms. If the face of a document is
an unreliable guide, courts that must identify standard form terms will be
forced to examine a firm's contracting practices. A term in an acknowledg-
ment may be standard if it appears in all of the firm's acknowledgments.
Yet if the firm charges the same price to all of its customers, the price will
also be a standard term by that criterion, and if the firm then alters the price
or any other term for a particular customer or class of customers, the term
will lose its standard status.
The second, and perhaps more important change in formation
procedures is the electronic transmission of documents of sale. 9  This
process often involves a third-party "provider," which transmits documents
in electronic form between the buyer and the seller.' The ABA Task
Force predicted that electronic data interchange (EDI) "will likely become
the predominant method of sales contracting,""241 and the practice has
237. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 70, at 1226 n.17.
238. See generally David Claiborne, Windows Adds WYSIWYG to Form Design, PC
WEEK, Mar. 18, 1991, at 89; Jennifer Edstrom, Printer Suite Debuts-ASf400 Customersto
Get Turnkey Solutions, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Aug. 23, 1993, at 110; Douglas S.
Price, Electronic Forms are Timesavers, Speaker Says; Speech by Lee Waxman of Xerox
Corp., GOv'T COMPUTER NEWS, June 12, 1989, at 148.
239. See generally BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1991);
EDI Report, supra note 195.
240. EDI Report, supra note 195, at 1655-56.
241. Id. at 1649.
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already become common in some industries. 2  Indeed, there are "fully
automated EDI environment[s]," in which there is no "human decision
making with respect to particular transactions."243
EDI often occurs in the context of longstanding business relationships,
particularly requirements and output contracts." The Task Force's study
revealed that non-management employees, who had little contact with
lawyers, would initiate the practice 5 with the firm's "most loyal or
trusted trading partners. "I Within an industry, large firms are likely to
lead in EDI implementation, driven by the desire to reduce the costs of their
many transactions. These firms then either mandate or offer incentives for
use of the practice by their suppliers.247
242. See Bob Adams, High Tech BringsNew Tax Questions, PETROLEUM INDEPENDENT,
Nov. 1991, at 40; Leila Davis, Retailers Go Shopping for EDI, DATAMATION, Mar. 1, 1989,
at 53; Distributors Moving Toward EDI and Bar Coding, INDUS. DISTRIBUTION, Oct. 1989,
at 13; Kate Evans-Correia, Purchasing Now Biggest EDI User, PURCHASING, Oct. 21, 1993,
at 47; Tim Minahan, Postal Service Makes Major Commitment to EDI for Routine Business
Transactions, GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS, Sept. 20, 1993, at 3; Robert Mullins, Despite Its
Price Tag, Retail SuppliersLog Onto ElectronicData Interchange, Bus. J.-MILWAUKEE, Oct.
10, 1992, at A18; Bruce Newburger, Agents and EDI: Threat or Opportunity?, AGENCY
SALES MAG., Mar. 1993, at 23; Anne E. Skagen, Nurturing Relationships, Enhancing
Quality With Electronic Data Interchange, MGMT. REV., Feb. 1989, at 28; Stephen D.
Sprinkle et al., Industry on the Move, BOBBIN, July 1991, at 43; Benjamin Wright, Record-
keeping for Electronic Transactions, TAX EXECUTIVE, Sept. 1989, at 40.
243. EDI Report, supra note 195, at 1657; see also Mullins, supra note 242; Julie Ritzer
Ross, Developments Cut Costs, Speed Shipments, GLOBAL TRADE, Nov. 1991, at 14.
244. EDI Report, supra note 195, at 1657 n.35.
245. Id. at 1658.
246. Id. n.37. For a report that EDI in turn enhanced trust between a firm and its
customers, see Ross, supra note 243, at 14. Anne Skagen observes that "EDI fosters
customer-supplier partnerships-long-term procurement relationships founded on mutual
commitment." Skagen, supra note 242, at 28. Trust between the parties and the lack of
lawyer involvement may explain the Task Force's finding that those who implemented EDI
usually did so with no concern over whether the resulting formalities satisfied the statute of
frauds. EDI Report, supra note 195, at 1681.
247. EDI Report, supra note 195, at 1657 n.36; see Paul F. Daisy, Resisting EDI Could
Be Hazardousto YourFirm, TRANSP. & DISTRIBUTION, June 1988, at 61; Jeanne Iida, Wesco
Plans to Drop Suppliers Not Using EDI, METALWORKING NEWS, May 1, 1989, at 38; Pat
Natschke Lenius, Super Valu May Charge Non-UCS-EDI Users, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Nov.
13, 1989, at 28; John Mutter & Maria Heidkamp, Walden Pushes Vendors to Order
Electronically, PUB. WEEKLY, Mar. 30, 1992, at 7; Newburger, supra note 242, at 23;
Skagen, supra note 242, at 28.
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Yet some writers report resistance to EDI.2' One observes that
"[flor a specialty manufacturer-with a delivery cycle of several months, a
broad customer mix, and few open orders-EDI simply does not make
sense."249 If one of the parties to a sales transaction is unable to "partici-
pate in electronic links," the provider may furnish it with paper copies of
documents the other party has sent electronically. 50  The paper copies
arrive either in the mail or via facsimile machines."5 Moreover, some
companies that do participate nevertheless send paper confirmations of EDI
transmissions.'
The Task Force found that information transmitted electronically is
normally limited to performance terms, and "does not generally include
'back-side' terms and conditions. " ' One reason for this is that the
"standard transaction sets" necessary for electronic transmission cannot
incorporate both the necessary performance terms and a full set of break-
down terms.254
Both provider firms and EDI consultants encouraged buyers and
sellers to adopt "trading partner agreements," which could set forth agreed-
upon breakdown terms. The Task Force discovered, however, that most
firms failed to execute these agreements. 5  Although the agreements that
248. See Alice Messing, What it Takes to be a Virtual Enterprise, U.S. DISTRIBUTION
J., Oct. 15, 1993, at 38; Skagen, supra note 242, at 28. Skagen noted that, as of 1989, 5000
firms in the United States used EDI, and that Coopers & Lybrand projected a steady increase
of 1500 to 2000 firms per year. Id. Yet she also noted that "[gliven the fact that there are
upwards of 3 million businesses presently operating in the U.S., current figures hardly
suggest an incipient revolution." Id.
249. Skagen, supra note 242, at 28.
250. Amy Bermar, SoCal EdisonAdopts EDI to Keep Its Suppliers Satisfied, PC WEEK,
May 10, 1988, at C4.
251. Id.
252. The Task Force found that "mid-to-small size" firms often confirmed EDI
transmissions with paper documents. EDI Report, supra note 195, at 1658. This practice
had become less common at the conclusion of the study, however, and the Task Force
expected it to become even less so in the future. Id. n.39.
253. Id. at 1656 n.30. For a description of the various steps involved in the transmission
process, see id. at 1681 n.152.
254. See id. at 1698. A "transaction set" is "an electronic document format." Id. at
1660 n.49; see also id. at 1703 n.233; WRIGHT, supra note 239, § 17.4, at 320-21;
McCarthy, supra note 230, at 1024-25. But see WRIGHT, supranote 239, § 17.43, at 323-24.
255. EDI Report, supra note 195, at 1657-58.
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did exist were diverse, many contained "unilateral" provisions favorable to
the large firms that prepared them. 6 In some cases, the master agree-
ments defined the terms and conditions of sale as those of the parties' paper
documents, even when the paper documents were in conflict.' In other
cases, the master agreements simply did not address the issue of breakdown
terms2 58
ii. Terms of the Agreement
EDI users informed the Task Force that "they did not intend to
conduct business on terms and conditions different than those reflected by
the 'backside' of their standard written documents. ", There is evident
tension between this information and the finding that EDI use is most
common between trusted trading partners that do business either without
master agreements or with master agreements that do not resolve breakdown
issues. The Task Force suggested that some firms might solve the problem
by declining to adopt the technology.2' Another possibility, which the
Task Force did not discuss, is that selling firms that are forced to contract
electronically with powerful buyers may give implied blanket assents to the
buyers' breakdown terms even in the absence of express trading partner
agreement on those terms.
2. Implications
Three features of this record of empirical data render inappropriate the
use of any of the four transactional models as a basis for the law of
additional terms. First, the record is nearly nonexistent in comparison to the
volume of sales activity in the United States. A study conducted more than
thirty years ago in one state, coupled with an English survey of nineteen
firms in one line of business, the Task Force's report, and a few first-hand
accounts, cannot tell the drafters of the revised Code what breakdown terms
the typical buyer or seller envisions, or even whether there is such a thing
as a typical buyer or seller.
256. Id. at 1661.
257. Id. at 1698.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 1698-99.
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Second, the record offers little or no support for the main feature of
any of the four models. Both the Brown version and the Murray version of
blanket assent suffer from the lack of evidence that sales employees have
authority to agree to terms other than those stated on their firms' docu-
ments." No report furnishes any direct evidence of the specific version
of blanket assent that Brown's model incorporates, or indicates that the terms
of an agreement depend on whether documents function as offer and
acceptance or as confirmations. No findings support the notion that firms
give blanket assents of which their sales employees are unaware. And there
is little evidence that buying and selling firms would respond to a change in
the law of the battle of the forms.
No evidence indicates that conspicuous language on a form paper
document, whether printed or handwritten, produces any change in
expectations about terms. Thus, there is no support for the distinction in the
Brown, Murray, and Taylor models between typical and atypical transac-
tions, at least insofar as that distinction is based on the appearance of the
documents. Moreover, any assumptions made on that basis may have little
or no validity in an environment of computer-generated documents or
electronic contracting.
Murray's finding that purchasing agents see an "identity" between
their commercial understanding and the standard terms of Article 2 does
offer some support for his contention that parties give blanket assents to
those terms. Yet an inchoate understanding hardly evidences assent to the
Article's specific breakdown terms. Moreover, Murray "dealt with a much
smaller number of [sellers'] representatives," '262 whose commercial
understanding he does not report. The understanding of these represen-
tatives may differ in important respects from that of their purchasing agent
counterparts. Macaulay has observed, for example, that "industrial sellers
almost never give voluntarily" a full set of "warranties subject to a liability
for consequential damages. "I And Murray provides some corroboration
261. Brown acknowledges that sales employees may lack the necessary authority.
Brown, supra note 25, at 926.
262. Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1350 n.162.
263. Lawrence M. Friedman & Stewart Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract
Teaching: Past, Present, and Future, 1967 WIs. L. REv. 805, 818. This observation appears
in the context of the authors' criticism of§ 2-207. See id. at 818-19. Murray disagrees with
their "astonishing interpretation" of the section, but does not contest their observation about
warranties. Murray, Realism, supra note 5, at 270 n.4; see also Letter from Benjamin
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for Macaulay's observation by contrasting the implied warranty of
merchantability-an Article 2 standard term and thus part of the "normal
factual bargain"-with "the typical warranty of repair or replacement
preferred by [the seller]."' Although the contrast is technically between
a warranty and a remedy,' it nevertheless suggests that the warranty of
merchantability is not part of the typical agreement.
Third, the variety and mutability of the practices revealed in the record
suggest that any model will be inaccurate in many cases. Moreover,
particular findings actively undercut some features of the four extant models.
Macaulay's findings regarding dispute resolution, for example, are
inconsistent with any notion of blanket assent, either to the standard terms
of Article 2 or to provisions in form documents that purport to make the
other party liable for full expectation damages. If buyers and sellers expect
to settle most disputes informally, they do not expect to go to court in most
cases and probably expect compromise rather than relief, much less full
expectation relief, for only one party. The existence of these expectations
even when agreements are fully negotiated suggests that they may be
pervasive when the parties exchange conflicting documents.
Macaulay's findings also suggest that one-sided drafting might persist
even under a rigidly enforced last shot doctrine; enforcement of sellers'
terms in the small number of transactions actually litigated might offer
counsel for a buyer insufficient incentive to negotiate breakdown terms ex
ante, thus foregoing the perceived benefits of a one-sided document in
settlement negotiations. As Professor Todd Rakoff' and Llewellyn267
both suggest, one-sided terms may reflect counsel's "professional ethos,"
and standardized documents of sale may help management-level personnel
maintain a firm's internal organization." To the extent that the existence
Wright to Article 2 Drafting Committee (Feb. 7, 1993), reprinted in Mark E. Roszkowski
& John D. WIadis, Revised U. C.C. Section 2-207: Analysis and Recommendations, 49 Bus.
LAW. 1065, 1069 (1994).
264. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 228.
266. See Rakoff, supra note 25, at 1221; see also Beale & Dugdale, supra note 194, at
57.
267. See Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 LAW REvISION COMMISSION,
REPORT TO THE N.Y. LEGISLATURE OF 1954, at 113 (1954) (quoted in Murray, Solutions,
supra note 64, at 1350).
268. Rakoff, supra note 25, at 1223.
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and nature of the form terms are interwoven with the internal structure of the
firm, they are unlikely to change in response to changes in legal doc-
trine.269
Indeed, Beale and Dugdale's discovery of resistance to "balanced"
breakdown terms suggests that the battle of the forms may serve the needs
of both a firm's counsel and its sales force. Counsel has the opportunity to
exercise skill in drafting one-sided provisions and to brandish those
provisions in settlement negotiations. Sales personnel enjoy freedom to
follow flexible implied terms because conflict between form provisions
reduces the area of express agreement.
Reports that sales personnel seldom pay attention to form language,
and that parties often fail to reach agreement on breakdown terms, do lend
support to Taylor's view that many agreements consist only of performance
terms. Moreover, the Beale and Dugdale study generally corroborates his
views regarding implied terms.
The overall message of the record, however, is that even Taylor's
model is inappropriate. The indiscriminate use of form documents and the
lack of substantial evidence of typical as opposed to atypical agreements
suggests that his most basic distinction is unduly detailed. And given the
record's limitations, it is entirely possible that there are many situations in
which the parties' expectations match one of the other models. Inequalities
in bargaining power of the sort the Task Force observed, for example, may
induce sellers to give blanket assents to buyers' breakdown terms. T20
There is simply not enough proof of order in the world of the battle of the
forms-or even of what that world is-to justify a Code section based on
preconceptions about the formation or terms of an agreement for sale.
269. Moreover, if firms use form documents in part for internal reasons, they are
unlikely to give blanket assents to terms that depart from their own, whether the terms are
those of another firm's document or those of Article 2.
270. This does not necessarily mean that all or even any of those terms should be
enforceable. If the blanket assents exist in fact, the terms are part of the parties' agreement,
but they are nevertheless subject to review for unconscionability under § 2-302 and for other
failings under other sections in Article 2.
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III. Application
A hypothetical transaction described in the April 1992 Draft Revision
of Parts 1 and 2 of Article 2271 provides a useful vehicle for comparing
proposed section 2-204 to statutory alternatives based on the models of Brown,
Murray, and Taylor. The comparison focuses on the models, rather than on
specific proposed revisions, because the issues relate to underlying concepts
rather than specific statutory language.
The comparison does not include an alternative based on Baird and
Weisberg's model. The hypothetical transaction involves documents that do
not agree on the subject of dispute resolution-documents that would not exist
in a jurisdiction in which a rigid last shot rule had produced a negotiated
dispute-resolution term acceptable to both parties. The Baird and Weisberg
thesis is not testable by means of the hypothetical, and the drafters of the
revised Code should reject it simply because of its lack of empirical sup-
port.2r2
Application to the hypothetical transaction demonstrates that none of the
three remaining models is as responsive to business settings as proposed
section 2-204. A revision based on Brown's model will be the most formal-
istic, leading courts to focus almost exclusively on the parties' documents. A
revision based on Murray's model, although less formalistic, will direct
judicial attention primarily to the standard terms of Article 2. A revision
based on Taylor's model will be the most responsive of the three, as well as
the most consistent with proposed section 2-204. Yet the very fact that
271. See 1992 Draft Revision, supra note 33, pt. 2, at 27.
272. Baird and Weisberg might raise a twofold objection: (1) the fault lies in the
hypothetical, rather than in their model, and (2) the other models also lack empirical support.
With respect to the first objection, the only hypothetical that would test their model is not a
transaction but rather a jurisdiction that maintains a rigidly enforced last shot doctrine.
Although a hypothetical transaction can be brought to ground in some respects, see infra text
accompanying notes 273-308, a hypothetical jurisdiction cannot. And with respect to the
second objection, although the authors would be correct, a revision based at least in part on
each of the other models has been considered by either the Study Group or the Drafting
Committee or both. See Prelim. Rpt., supra note 11, at 21-23 (recommending consideration
of Murray's proposed revision); September 1993 Draft Revision, supra note 33, at 15-21
(setting forth two possible revisions: Alternative A, based largely on Brown's model, and
Alternative B, based at least in part on Taylor's model); 1992 Draft Revision, supra note 33,
pt. 2, at 31-32 (setting forth "Kunz-McCarthy proposal," evidently based on Taylor's model).
It is therefore useful to examine the operation of the other models despite their lack of
empirical support. Professor Herbert has noted the absence of support for the Baird and
Weisberg view. Herbert, supra note 176, at 478-79.
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Taylor's model describes typical transactions will lead courts to approach cases
like the hypothetical with those transactions in mind. Only proposed section
2-204 requires an open-ended inquiry that begins with the parties' agreement.
Like many reported cases under section 2-207, the hypothetical involves
an arbitration clause in the seller's document:
S and B do business in a trade where arbitration is a common
method of dispute resolution. S and B have done business before, and
S's standard forms have always contained an arbitration clause.
Assume that B orders goods, S accepts the offer, ships the goods and
mails an acknowledgment form containing an arbitration clause. B
accepts and uses the goods and, later, resists arbitration when a dispute
over quality develops.
273
B's order evidently did not mention arbitration, and there is no indication that
the parties have ever settled a dispute by that means. 4
The hypothetical includes limited information about the transaction's
context; arbitration is common in the industry but the industry is not
identified. More complete information about context will make the compari-
son among proposed section 2-204 and the alternatives both more realistic and
more revealing.
The textile industry furnishes an appropriate context, for three reasons.
First, many of the reported arbitration cases under section 2-207 have
involved sales of textiles.' Second, commentators 6 and courtsW
alike cite the industry as one in which arbitration is the customary means of
settling sales disputes.278 And third, there is some published information
about the prevalence of textile arbitrations. The information is approximately
twenty-five years old, which does not undermine its illustrative value for
273. 1992 Draft Revision, supra note 33, pt. 2, at 27.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 330-59 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., ROBERT M. RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION WITH FORMS, §
29.1, at 630 (1984).
277. See N&D Fashions, Inc. v. DIIJ Indus., 548 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1976); infra
text accompanying notes 337-48.
278. For historical information relating to textile arbitrations, see BARBARA M. TUCKER,
SAMUEL SLATER AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN TEXTILE INDUSTRY 1790-1860, 212
(1984); Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States,
12 MINN. L. REv. 240 (1928); William C. Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration
in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193.
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purposes of analysis of the hypothetical transaction, and indeed permits an
assessment of the courts' responsiveness to business reality during the years
following its publication.
Many writers have described various features of the textile industry,
and in the late 1960s, Professor Robert Bonn conducted an empirical study of
textile arbitrations. 9  Bonn reports that "[tihe American textile industry
consist[ed] of literally thousands of independent firms, each of which [was]
specialized by function, by type of material handled, and by end-product
usage."' Among these firms, capitalization and general economic strength
were concentrated at the beginning of the manufacturing chain; mills, for
example, tended to be much stronger than garment manufacturers. 211 Mills
and converters usually sold on credit, with a "sixty- or ninety-day 'grace' or
allowance period. "I
Each of the several sales in the manufacturing chain held the potential
for a dispute, and three features of the industry made disputes especially
likely. First, late delivery could have serious consequences "because of the
instability of the market for textile end products. "I Second, problems with
the quality of cloth were common "because no textile material is ever perfect
and the standards used to judge the extent of the imperfections [might] vary
markedly depending on the particular individual who happen[ed] to be
judging. "I And third, the economic weakness of firms at the buying end
of the manufacturing chain often led to late payment.28 Disputes occurred
when "buyers ... delay[ed] or refuse[d] to pay for goods ordered and
received charging that sellers were either late in delivery or delivered material
of inferior quality. "I
279. Robert L. Bonn, The Predictability of Nonlegalistic Adjudication, 6 L. & SOc'Y
REv. 563, 567 (1972).
280. Id. at 565.
281. See id. at 566.
282. Id. at 573.
283. Id. at 566.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.; see also Frederic P. Houston, Textile Transactions, in ARBITRATION:
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND TORT CLAIMS 145, 150-52 (Alan I. Widis ed.,
1979).
REVISION OF ARTICLE 2
Bonn cites an estimate that "95 to 100 percent of textile contracts
[contained arbitration] clauses,"' and also offers the general observation
that "[t]he industry handle[d]... disputes arising between buyers and sellers
of textile products through the mechanism of commercial arbitration."I
Bonn's description of his principal source of data indicates, however,
that the number of arbitrations was actually much smaller than the number of
disputes:
With the intention of exploring the issue of predictability of
case outcomes, a study was made of commercial textile cases
arbitrated through the American Arbitration Association for the years
1967 and 1968. There were a total of 91 cases in 1967 and 100 in
1968 in which an arbitral award was rendered. 9
Given the number of transactions that must have occurred among the
thousands of firms and the high potential for disputes in each transaction,
there must have been more than ninety-one disputes in 1967 and 100 in
1968.29 Bonn's report of his interviews with five lawyers who specialized
in textile arbitration confirms this inference: all said that "more than 95 % of
the disputes brought to them were resolved informally."29' Thus, arbitra-
tion was far more the exception than the rule.
Representatives of textile firms told Bonn they generally preferred
informality because "one does not arbitrate against a good present customer
or a customer who represents a good prospect for future business since
pressing claims against opponents in arbitration is not regarded as an
amicable way of conducting business. "2 Although there were some
287. Robert L. Bonn, Arbitration:An Alternative System forHandling ContractRelated
Disputes, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 254, 260 (1972).
288. Bonn, supra note 279, at 566.
289. Id. at 567. Of course, there could have been arbitration in other forums, such as
the General Arbitration Council of the Textile Industry. See 25 YEARs: THE ASSOCIATION
OF COTTON TEXTILE MERCHANTS OF NEW YORK 1918-1943, at 22-23 (1944) [hereinafter
25 YEARS]. Even so, Bonn's interviews suggest that very few disputes were arbitrated.
290. Cf. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. Rnv. 4 (1983).
291. Bonn, supra note 279, at 572.
292. Id. at 573.
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exceptions, in general a selling firm would arbitrate against a customer only
if it were willing to lose the customer.2
This principle of case selection meant that arbitration tended to occur
between sellers and "marginal buyers, i.e., buyers who were very small
firms or buyers with whom the seller[s] enjoyed or expected to enjoy only
a very marginal business relationship."2' The procedure might be seen
as "a device by which sellers [could] recover monies owed by marginal
buyers ... [-] as much a 'collection tool' as it [was] a type of legal or
quasi-legal system."295 As such, "it [became] a measure of last resort by
which sellers [could] recover accounts rather than a court in which two
parties 'battle[d] out' an important factual or even legal issue. "296 One of
the most important of its advantages over litigation was simply that it was
much faster."
Sellers also tended not to pursue arbitration if the buyer had a
legitimate reason for refusing to pay.298 When they did arbitrate, they
were well prepared and represented by counsel.2' Outcomes were
therefore highly predictable: sellers prevailed in the great majority of
cases.
300
Bonn's findings suggest an explanation for both the presence of the
arbitration clause in the acknowledgment sent by the hypothetical seller, S,
and the absence of the clause in the purchase order sent by B. S generally
sold cloth on credit, and management and/or counsel wanted to be able to
collect efficiently by means of arbitration if necessary, or at least to use the
threat of arbitration in negotiating a settlement. B generally bought cloth on
credit, and-if anyone in the firm gave thought to the issue-its management
and/or counsel realized that it would have more leverage in a dispute if the
ultimate resolution took place in the courts.
More important than the content of the documents, however, are S and
B's ex ante expectations about what would actually happen if a dispute
293. Id.; see Bonn, supra note 287, at 262.
294. Bonn, supra note 279, at 574.
295. Id. at 575.
296. Id.
297. Bonn, supra note 287, at 260.
298. Bonn, supra note 279, at 574.
299. Id. at 574-75.
300. Id. at 575.
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occurred. Bonn did not address this issue per se. He focused on the
prevalence of arbitration and the predictability of its outcomes rather than the
states of mind in which parties entered into agreements of sale. Yet his
findings suggest some possible conclusions.
The high potential for disputes in the textile industry suggests that S
and B probably had some knowledge, if only in general terms, about what
textile buyers and sellers did when transactions broke down. And the
common use of arbitration provisions in sales agreements suggests that sales
personnel in the industry were more aware of the procedure than were the
purchasing agents with whom Murray spoke."' Thus, S and B might well
have known that textile disputes were more likely to be resolved in
arbitration than in litigation.
Yet general knowledge of dispute resolution procedures is not the
same as an expectation about the possible breakdown of a particular
transaction. The hypothetical does not indicate whether S and B have ever
had disputes before, but the fact that they have continued to do business
suggests that they have either had none or settled informally any that did
arise. Nothing in the hypothetical indicates, in Bonn's terms, that B had
become a marginal buyer in S's eyes, and therefore both parties probably
expected the process of informal settlement to continue in the future. Each
party might even have expected that, if compromise failed in a particular
instance, one party would abandon its claim for the sake of preserving the
relationship. This would not necessarily mean that the dispute would have
no future consequences; both parties might well be aware that the relation-
ship, although preserved, would be less favorable to the party that refused
to compromise.
Only if B had been a marginal buyer in S's eyes would S have
anticipated the possibility of eventually filing a demand for arbitration. Yet
if B were marginal and aware of that status, it might have anticipated
resisting the eventual demand. Thus, in the only circumstances that held any
prospect of arbitration, the parties would probably have disagreed about the
use of the procedure.
The parties' expectations might depend to some extent on the price of
the textile goods-a fact not specified in the hypothetical. Although it was
cheaper than litigation," Bonn found that arbitration did entail costs,
including attorney's fees: "sellers using the aid of their counsel prepare[d]
301. See supra text accompanying note 228.
302. Bonn, supra note 287, at 261.
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quite thoroughly the cases which [were] to go into arbitration even to the
extent of engaging in mock sessions during which their counsel test[ed] them
at length on their factual knowledge of the case and the arguments to be
presented. 3" Both parties might be aware that S would view the
expenditure of time and money as justifiable only to recover a large amount.
If the parties' contingent expectations about arbitration were not in
agreement, of course, the ultimate resolution of the dispute might be in the
courts-a result that seems at odds with Bonn's generalization about the
prevalence of textile arbitrations, as well as with the notion that litigation is
the least amicable means of settling disputes.
The conflict is more apparent than real, however, for two reasons.
First, nothing in Bonn's study indicates that S and B's battle-of-the-forms
method of contracting was common in the textile industry. The prevalence
of arbitrations may have reflected either widespread use of standard sales
agreements that contained arbitration clauses, executed by both parties or by
agents acting for both parties, or buyer and seller membership in trade
associations whose bylaws required use of the procedure.'0
4
Second, the issue is not whether arbitration is preferable as a matter
of social policy, but rather what the parties expected ex ante,' and the
"amicable" nature of arbitration in comparison to litigation may not have
been apparent to B." Given its efficacy as a collection tool, some buyers
may have viewed the procedure as biased in favor of sellers.3" And if it
303. Bonn, supra note 279, at 575.
304. See 25 YEARS, supra note 289, at 22-23; Nellemann v. Spartan Sportswear, Inc.,
201 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
305. The question under the Code and the law of arbitration is whether B agreed to
follow the procedure. See Dale B. Furnish, Commercial Arbitration Agreements and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 67 CAL. L. REv. 317, 320-21 (1979). For analysis of the
relation between state law and federal arbitration law, see Linda R. Hirshman, The Second
Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985).
306. For a general summary of criticisms of commercial arbitration, see Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 441-53 (1988). Perceived
problems include unqualified arbitrators. Id. at 447-50.
307. Bonn reports that a "practice" of lawyers who specialized in textile arbitration "was
to reject out of hand all arbitrators who did not represent the same branch of industry as the
client in the particular case under the theory that an arbitrator representing a different branch
of the industry would not perceive the case in the proper manner." Bonn, supra note 279,
at 572 (footnote omitted). This suggests that textile merchants were not always confident of
the fairness of the procedure.
REVISION OF ARTICLE 2
did not expect to continue buying from S, B would not expect to engage in
arbitration rather than litigation for the sake of preserving the relation-
ship.'
Bonn's findings by no means demonstrate that S and B failed to agree
on arbitration. His report does suggest, however, that their business
relationship held implications for the manner in which they would resolve
their disputes. The important question about any successor to section 2-207
is not what result it will produce in the case, but rather whether the court
will examine these implications, as well as all other evidence of the parties'
expectations.
A. Proposed Section 2-204
The parties clearly intended to enter into a bargain, so there was an
agreement under proposed section 2-204.11 The question is whether the
arbitration provision in S's acknowledgment was part of the agreement.
Under subsection (c), B did not agree to the provision expressly. S will
argue, however, that implied agreement existed because the provision
corresponded to an applicable course of dealing or usage of trade.310
Under section 1-205(1), "[a] course of dealing is a sequence of previous
conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be
regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting
their expressions and other conduct." '' S will argue that both parties
understood that they would go to arbitration if settlement negotiations failed
because the documents it sent B in the past always included the arbitration
clause. B will counter that the relationship furnished no basis for an
understanding that the parties would actually use the procedure. They
evidently have not arbitrated disputes in the past, and B may even be able to
308. Contrast, perhaps, the attitude of a party engaging in a continuing relationship with
a trading partner of greater bargaining power, and agreeing to the partner's terms for the sake
of preserving the relationship. See supra text accompanying notes 247, 260.
309. The exchange of documents coupled with performance (conduct) clearly reveals the
intention to enter into a bargain. And under subsection (b)(2), even if the parties disagreed
about arbitration, the price, quantity, and delivery terms will permit the court to give an
appropriate remedy.
310. S will not be able to claim that there was a course of performance, because the
agreement did not "involvef- repeated occasions for performance by either party." U.C.C.
§ 2-208(l) (1990).
311. Id. § 1-205(l).
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persuade the trier of fact that its sales personnel never noticed the provision
in the acknowledgment. Indeed, the relationship was probably inconsistent
with an expectation of arbitration, as any past disputes were settled by
negotiation.
The basic issue under section 1-205(1) is whether an implied
arbitration term arose from the mere presence of the provision in the
documents or whether it can arise only from a series of instances in which
parties actually employ the procedure. 1 2 However the court resolves this
issue, the result should be an increased understanding of section 1-205(1).
Under section 1-205(2), "[a] usage of trade is any practice or method
of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade
as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question."313  S will cite Bonn's generalization about the
prevalence of arbitration in the textile industry. 4 The very fact that S is
pursuing arbitration probably indicates that it now views B as a marginal
buyer, and S may argue that it always held that view. B will counter that
very few cases are arbitrated,1 5 and that it had no reason ex ante to think
of itself as a marginal buyer in S's eyes, particularly given the parties'
history of dealings, so any usage of seller arbitration against marginal buyers
is inapplicable. Indeed, if B persuaded the court that it was not marginal,
it might be able to show the existence and applicability of a usage according
to which S would abandon its claim instead of attempting to compel
arbitration." 6 If B was marginal and aware of that status, moreover, it
will claim that it therefore expected to insist on litigation.
Just as proposed section 2-204 cannot resolve the argument over
course of dealing, so too it must leave unresolved the argument over trade
312. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 103-04 (3d Cir.
1991) ("While one court has concluded that terms repeated in a number of written
confirmations eventually become part of the contract even though neither party ever takes any
action with respect to the issue addressed by those terms, most courts have rejected such
reasoning." (footnotes omitted)); see also Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Sales
Contracts, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 789, 794 (1993) (asking whether terms, as opposed to
meanings, can be implied from course of dealing under definition in § 1-205(1)).
313. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1990).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 287-88.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 289-300.
316. The enforceability of this usage would be irrelevant to the issue of the parties'
expectations.
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usage. Bonn's findings suggest that many textile buyers and sellers would
not have anticipated arbitration, but section 1-205(2) requires an inquiry into
S and B's justifiable expectations about a particular transaction-an inquiry
that must be both unbiased and open-ended-and S may be able to make the
requisite showing. Whatever the outcome, proposed section 2-204 can again
claim credit for exposing the issue of the legal status of unexpressed
contingent expectations.
The open-ended nature of proposed section 2-204 may, however, raise
fears of judicial abuse. Those who have followed the battle of the forms
over the years may be especially concerned that courts might adopt a rigid
version of the mirror image rule or the last shot rule. The proposed section
provides only that parties "may" make an agreement despite differences
between their documents, and it permits a court to find that the recipient of
the last document sent has agreed to its terms. "Welshers"31 7 might
therefore be able to escape from their agreements on the basis of differences
in form provisions, and the hypothetical buyer, B, might find itself bound
to S's arbitration provision even though it had not actually agreed to
arbitrate.
317. White and Summers use this term. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 1-3, at
29-30.
318. S can argue either that (1) B's performance with knowledge or reason to know of
the arbitration provision manifested agreement to arbitrate, or (2) B is, for some reason,
estopped from resisting enforcement of the arbitration provision. Proposed § 2-204 leaves
room for the first argument by not prescribing the exclusive means of reaching agreement on
a particular term. S should and will prevail if it can show that both parties actually expected
arbitration. Additional facts that would strengthen the argument are, for example, that both
parties knew the transaction was of unusual economic importance to S, so that the expense
of arbitration would be justifiable, or that S's representatives made clear in the course of
negotiation that arbitration was essential. See, e.g., Advance Concrete Forms, Inc. v.
McCann Constr. Specialties Co., 916 F.2d 412, 413-14 (7th Cir. 1990); Roszkowski &
Wladis, supra note 263, at 1075. The hypothetical does not include those facts, however, and
the likelihood without more is that B, and probably even S, did not anticipate arbitration.
S's second argument is that, even though B did not agree to arbitrate, B is estopped
from resisting S's demand for the procedure. S will make this argument, which concerns the
terms of the contract as opposed to those of the agreement, not under proposed § 2-204 but
rather under § 1-103. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1990). On the facts as presented in the
hypothetical, the argument should not succeed. Suppose, however, that B was knowingly a
marginal buyer, that S had made clear in negotiations that it would eventually file a demand
for arbitration if necessary, and perhaps that the transaction was important enough to justify
the expense of the procedure. Particularly if B was aware of the importance of the
transaction to S, a court could justifiably find that S had reasonably relied on not having to
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Yet courts are unlikely for three reasons to enforce mirror image and
last shot as rigid, or even general rules. First, commentators have reported
that the rules often were not rigidly enforced in pre-Code cases.3"9
Second, the rules are based on transactional models, and the text of proposed
section 2-204 is clearly antithetical to models in general. The drafters of the
revised Code will be able to stress this point effectively in the Official
Comments to the new section, emphasizing that there is no intention to
permit courts to resurrect the rules.
Third, in both the basic course on Contracts and advanced courses on
Sales, teachers and casebook authors have routinely denounced Poel v.
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.3 'C and Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett &
Co.3 21 for the past thirty years.3' Indeed, many first-year students have
realized that the Roto-Lith court not only distorted the text of section 2-207,
but also subverted the purposes of the Code by applying the mirror image
and last shot rules to an exchange of form documents. An entire generation
of lawyers and judges has thus learned that neither mirror image nor last
shot belongs in Article 2.'
Professor Jesse Dukeminier has observed that "lawyers are creatures
of habit,"' and Dean Roscoe Pound believed that "[t]enacity of a taught
legal tradition is much more significant in our legal history than the
litigate to collect, even if it also found that B had not agreed to the arbitration provision.
Nothing in proposed § 2-204 is inconsistent with the conclusion that estoppel should require
B to arbitrate; indeed, the contextual analysis the section prescribes is conducive to the
discovery of any available evidence that would support a finding of estoppel. For arguments
in favor of the use of estoppel principles in the context of the battle of the forms, see
Roszkowski, supra note 176, at 160-62; Roszkowski & Wladis, supra note 263, at 1074-75.
319. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 70, at 1233-35; John L. Gedid, A Background
to Variance Problems Underthe Uniform Commercial Code: TowardA ContextualApproach,
22 DUQ. L. REv. 595, 632 (1984); Wladis, supra note 28, at 1036-37.
320. 110 N.E. 619 (N.Y. 1915).
321. 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
322. See, e.g., FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 65, at 601-02, 607; KNAPP &
CRYSTAL, supra note 35, at 277-79, 289.
323. Cf. HONNOLD, supra note 93, § 170.3, at 238 ("'Last shot' theories have been
rightly criticized as casuistic and unfair. They do not reflect international consensus that
justifies importing them into the [United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods]." (footnote omitted)).
324. Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years
in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1027 (1987).
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economic conditions of time and place." 3I One need not agree completely
with Pound to believe that thirty years of instruction, coupled with
appropriate Official Comments, offers sufficient protection. 32
B. The Alternatives
Under each of the alternatives to proposed section 2-204, the court
will begin with the assumption that the transaction was typical. The party
that wishes to take advantage of a departure from the usual set of expecta-
tions will have the burden of proving that departure.
1. Brown
If the transaction was typical in Brown's model, B implicitly invited
S to supply a dispute-resolution term, and gave an advance blanket assent to
S's arbitration provision if it was not unfairly surprising. The unfair
surprise test imposes a "light" burden327 on S: the fact that B had the
opportunity to be thorough in preparing its form purchase order suggests
strongly that B does not care what forum the parties use to resolve disputes
that resist negotiation.3" Moreover, S will point out that textile contracts
often require arbitration, and that the documents it has sent B have always
included an arbitration provision. These arguments will almost certainly
persuade the court that there is no unfair surprise, and B will have to
arbitrate the dispute.
The court will reach this conclusion easily, on the basis of the parties'
documents and perhaps some testimony regarding the common use of
arbitration provisions in textile sales agreements. There will be no need to
ask how the parties have settled past disputes, or when, if ever, S began to
think of B as a marginal buyer. Having determined that there is no unfair
surprise, the court will be able to avoid the more difficult question of what
the parties expected.
A substantial body of evidence indicates that the court's analysis will
be superficial. Much of the sales activity in the textile industry over the
325. RoscoE POUND, THE FORMATvE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 82 (1938).
326. Cf. Robert C. Power, The Fast Food of Modern Legal Realism, 68 B.U. L. REV.
507, 510 n.21 (1988) (book review) (relating judicial activism to judges' legal education).
327. See supra note 142.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16.
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years has taken place in New York,329 and the New York courts have
decided many of the reported cases that concern the enforceability of textile
arbitration provisions.3  The response of these courts, traditionally
regarded as skilled in analysis of business problems, reveals that in practice
the notion of unfair surprise, incorporated in section 2-207(2)(b) under the
rubric of material alteration,33 is not conducive to contextual analysis.
In pre-Code cases, the New York courts' assessments of expectations
regarding arbitration were superficial at best. In a 1942 case, 332 for
example, the parties had engaged in twenty-odd transactions in which the
buyer ordered textiles orally and the seller shipped the goods and then sent
an invoice. 3  On the invoice, "there had been stamped in red ink the
words: 'All controversies arising from the sale of these goods are to be
settled by arbitration.'01 The seller's president testified, however, that
he did not mention arbitration in negotiating sales: "I never speak to a
customer about arbitration. It would be bad policy. 35 The court rejected
any connection among the parties' transactions; each sale stood on its own,
and by remaining silent in the face of the red stamp, the buyer had avoided
making the written agreement necessary to bind it under the New York
arbitration statute. 6
329. At times, sales activity has been heavily concentrated in New York City. 25
YEARS, supra note 289, at 4; Editor's note to Frederic P. Houston, A Barrierto Arbitration
in the Textile Industry, ARB. J., June, 1979, at 9.
330. See, e.g., Marlene Indus. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 239 (N.Y. 1978);
Helen Whiting, Inc., v. Trojan Textile Corp., 307 N.Y. 360 (1954); Tanenbaum Textile Co.
v. Schlanger, 287 N.Y. 400 (1942); Loudon Mfg. v. American & Efird Mills, 360 N.Y.S.2d
250 (App. Div. 1974); Tunis Mfg. v. Mystic Mills, 40 A.D.2d 664 (1972); Trafalgar Square,
Ltd. v. Reeves Bros., 315 N.Y.S.2d 239 (App. Div. 1970); Wachusett Spinning Mills v. Blue
Bird Silk Mfg., 7 A.D.2d 382, aff'dper curiam, 190 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1959); Pavia &
Co. v. Fulton County Silk Mills, 284 A.D. 391 (1954); In re Les Belles Enters., 17 U.C.C.
Rep. 909 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); C.M.I. Clothesmakers, Inc. v. A.S.K. Knits, Inc., 380
N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
331. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (1990); id. cmts. 4, 5.
332. Tanenbaum Textile Co. v. Schlanger, 287 N.Y. 400 (1942).
333. Id. at 401-03.
334. Id. at 403.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 404.
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In Helen Whiting, Inc. v. Trojan Textile Corp. ," decided in 1954,
the tide turned in favor of arbitration when the Court of Appeals offered a
slightly hedged remark: "From our own experience, we can almost take
judicial notice that arbitration [provisions] are commonly used in the textile
industry .... ,,"I The court reasoned that the buyer's familiarity with
these common provisions and its retention of the seller's documents meant
that it had agreed to arbitrate the parties' dispute.339
New York's enactment of the Code in 19624 produced no change
in this analysis. The remark in Helen Whiting made its way into many
opinions, none of which applied either the definition of course of dealing in
section 1-205(1) or the definition of usage of trade in section 1-205(2). 3"
The courts held that a buyer that retained an acknowledgment or invoice
thereby agreed to the arbitration provision it contained.' 42 In some
opinions, this conclusion was based upon a misreading of section
2-20 1(2),3 but in others, the courts simply reasoned on the basis of the
remark in Helen Whiting that an arbitration provision was not a material
alteration under section 2-207(2)(b) and was therefore enforceable against
337. 307 N.Y. 360 (1954).
338. Helen Whiting, Inc. v. Trojan Textile Corp., 307 N.Y. 360, 367 (1954).
339. Id. The case involved three sales, two of which were disputed. Id. at 362-63. In
the undisputed sale, the buyer signed the seller's writing, but in the disputed sales it did not.
Id. The buyer's president "testified that he was familiar with [arbitration provisions]," id.
at 367, but no testimony addressed the prevalence of the procedure as opposed to the
provisions.
340. New York enacted the Code in 1962, effective September 27, 1964. N.Y. U.C.C.
LAW § 1-101 (Consol. 1981).
341. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Armtex, Inc., 384 N.Y.S.2d 837, 838 (App.
Div. 1976); Gaynor-Stafford Indus. v. Mafco Textured Fibers, 384 N.Y.S.2d 788,790 (App.
Div. 1976); Trafalgar Square, Ltd. v. Reeves Bros., 315 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242 (App. Div.
1970); C.M.I. Clothesmakers, Inc. v. A.S.K. Knits, Inc., 380 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (Sup. Ct.
1975). Indeed, in 1974, the Appellate Division commented that "[the experience to date has
added strength to [the Helen Whiting] observation." Loudon Mfg. v. American & Efird
Mills, 360 N.Y.S.2d 250, 251 (App. Div. 1974).
342. See cases cited supra note 341.
343. The courts reasoned that under § 2-201(2) a buyer that retained a document for
more than 10 days with reason to know of the arbitration provision it contained thereby
agreed to the provision. See, e.g., Loudon Mfg. v. American & Efird Mills, 360 N.Y.S.2d
250,251 (App. Div. 1974); Trafalgar Square, Ltd., v. Reeves Bros., 315 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242
(App. Div. 1970).
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the textile buyer.' In a 1976 case,3' for example, the trial court found
that the buyer was unaware of the seller's arbitration provision.' The
appellate division nevertheless enforced the provision, observing that both
parties "were merchants [with] long experience in the textile industry" who
had "dealt with each other for seven months."' 7  For the appellate
division, the buyer's "claim that the arbitration clause in [the seller's] form
was a 'material alteration' of the terms of the contract between the parties
[was] negated by the rule in [Helen Whiting] that arbitration [was] common
in the textile industry."348
In 1978, in Marlene Industries v. Carnac Textiles, Inc.,3" the court
of appeals put an end to the rulings in favor of arbitration. Holding that the
textile buyer in the case need not arbitrate,35 the court drew on a 1962
decision, not involving textiles, in which it had taken a position on
arbitration.' Because an agreement to arbitrate "must be clear and direct,
and must not depend upon implication, inveiglement or subtlety... [its]
existence ... should not depend solely upon the conflicting fine print of
commercial forms which cross one another but never meet. "352
The court argued in Marlene that clear proof of agreement was
necessary because "by agreeing to arbitrate a party waives in large part many
of his normal rights under the procedural and substantive law of the State,
and it would be unfair to infer such a significant waiver on the basis of
344. See Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Armtex, Inc., 384 N.Y.S.2d 837, 838 (App. Div.
1976); Gaynor-Stafford Indus. v. Mafco Textured Fibers, 384 N.Y.S.2d 788,791 (App. Div.
1976). One court construed § 2-201(2) correctly, but nevertheless used its "reason to know"
notion to support the conclusion that the arbitration provision was not a material alteration
under § 2-207(2)(b). C.M.I. Clothesmakers, Inc. v. A.S.K. Knits, Inc., 380 N.Y.S.2d 447,
448-49 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
345. Gaynor-Stafford Indus. v. Mafco Textured Fibers, 384 N.Y.S.2d 788 (App. Div.
1976).
346. Id. at 790.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 791.
349. 380 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y. 1978).
350. Marlene Indus. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 239, 242 (N.Y. 1978).
351. See Doughboy Indus. v. Pantasote Co., 233 N.Y.S.2d 488,493 (App. Div. 1962).
352. Marlene, 380 N.E.2d at 242 (quoting Doughboy, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 493).
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anything less than a clear indication of intent."3 3  The textile seller's
arbitration clause was therefore excluded as a material alteration.' 5
Marlene may have been a decision about how textile merchants should
settle their disputes, but it was not a decision about how they did settle their
disputes. The court did not mention the prevalence of arbitration in the
industry. The Helen Whiting remark about textile arbitration clauses,
emphasized in the seller's brief on appeal,35 evidently vanished before the
court filed its opinion. Indeed, the court's statement of its holding indicated
that the result had nothing to do with textiles: "We hold that the inclusion of
an arbitration agreement materially alters a contract for the sale of goods,
and thus, pursuant to section [2-207(2)(b)], it will not become a part of such
a contract unless both parties explicitly agree to it. "356
The New York Court of Appeals has essentially maintained this view
since 1978.1s  Although other jurisdictions may be more favorably
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Brief for Respondent at 8, Marlene.
356. Marlene, 380 N.E.2d at 242. For criticism of the decision from a pro-arbitration
perspective, see Furnish, supra note 305, at 331. For an argument that the court should have
focused on unfair surprise rather than arbitration policy, see IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL.,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDs, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT § 17.5.3, at 17:37 (1994).
357. See Schubtex, Inc. v. Allen Snyder, Inc., 399 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1979). In
Schubtex, the court did focus on the practice of arbitration itself rather than simply on
arbitration provisions: "There is no evidence that in their prior dealings the parties ever
arbitrated any dispute pursuant to the arbitration clause or that the clause was material in their
negotiations." Id. at 1156. The court also observed that course of dealing and usage of trade
could be relevant to the issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Id. Yet the court
reaffirmed the rule that there would be no arbitration if that agreement was not express. Id.
The suggestion of the concurring judges that the court had abandoned that rule, id. at 1156-
59, disregarded the majority's insistence on a written agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 1156.
The court of appeals enforced a seller's arbitration provision in a 1980 case, but there
the buyer signed the first of several confirmation forms it received, all of which contained the
provision. See Ernest J. Michel & Co. v. Anabasis Trade, Inc., 409 N.E.2d 933, 933 (N.Y.
1980). The court made no inquiry into implied terms. Professors Macneil, Speidel, and
Stipanowich suggest that the Michel case effectively limited Marlene to battle-of-the-forms
situations in which "there [is] no evidence that the buyer was aware of the arbitration clause
or agreed to arbitrate." MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 356, § 17.5.3, at 17:37 n.40.
The remark from Helen Whiting resurfaced in 1986 in a case in which the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York enforced an arbitration provision
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disposed toward arbitration,"' decisions in other states do not reflect a more
detailed inquiry into expectations regarding textile arbitration." 9 Regardless
of whether the court enforces the arbitration provision of the hypothetical
seller, S, then, the textile cases suggest that a revision of section 2-207 based
on Brown's model is unlikely to generate a search for implied terms if the
transaction was typical.
S might argue, however, that the transaction was atypical-that its
acknowledgment was a counteroffer and, therefore, B agreed to the arbitration
provision even if it was a material alteration. This argument will probably not
succeed. The provision was not conspicuous, and no communication indicated
that S would do business only on the terms of the acknowledgment."W
2. Murray
Under a Code provision based on Murray's model, B will probably not
have to arbitrate the dispute. The normal sales agreement incorporates, via
blanket assent, "all judicial remedies," as those are standard under Article
2.361 If the transaction was typical, therefore, the court will be under no
obligation to examine its setting.
Nothing in Murray's model will prevent S from arguing that the
transaction was atypical, either because arbitration was a usage of the textile
industry or because the provision was always present in S's documents, and
this amounted to a course of dealing.362 Yet arbitration is a deviation from
in a confirmation sent by a broker to both the buyer and the seller. Inptex Int'l Corp. v.
Lorprint, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1572, 1572 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
358. See, e.g., N&D Fashions, Inc. v. DIJ Indus., 548 F.2d 722,727 (8th Cir. 1976).
For a non-textile case in which the court enforced an arbitration provision in a battle-of-the-
forms context, see Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709 (7th Cir.
1987).
359. See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972);
Frances Hosiery Mills v. Burlington Indus., 204 S.E.2d 834, 835-38 (N.C. 1974); see also
Herbert, supra note 176, at 459.
360. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. Murray has proposed a revised
version of § 2-207. Murray, Proposed Revision, supra note 96, at 355. There is a contract
under subsection (1) of his proposed revision, and its terms are those "the parties have
consciously considered"-presumably the performance terms-and "the standard terms of [the
Code]." Id.
362. On the basis of either the trade usage or the course of dealing, S could argue under
subsection (3) of Murray's proposed revision that B "reasonably should have understood"
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the standard judicial remedies of Article 2,363 and the generally suspect
character of deviations will reinforce the existing judicial reluctance to
search for implied terms. As a result, the court will probably treat the
transaction as typical and refuse to enforce the arbitration provision.
3. Taylor
If the transaction was typical, a court that applied Taylor's model
might ask the same questions that proposed section 2-204 will prompt:
whether the arbitration provision corresponded to a term implied from
course of dealing or usage of trade. The provision will be enforceable if it
corresponded to an implied term and unenforceable if it did not.
If the typical agreement did not contain an implied arbitration
provision, S will claim that the transaction was atypical because the
acknowledgment functioned as a counteroffer. There is no evidence,
however, of any telephone call or other communication of the sort that
Taylor regards as sufficient to make the transaction atypical. 3"
C. Summary
Proposed section 2-204 is designed to encourage lawyers and courts
to educate themselves about practices like the ones Bonn found, as well as
about the implications of particular parties' dealings with each other. As
applied to the hypothetical transaction set in the industry Bonn describes, the
proposed section is unlikely to require B to arbitrate its dispute with S. Yet
twenty-five years have passed since Bonn conducted his study, and current
textile practices may be very different from those that he found. In some
parts of the industry, for example, buyers may give blanket assents to
arbitration provisions in sellers' form documents. Nothing in the proposed
section would exclude evidence of, or even create a presumption against,
either the Brown version or the Murray version of blanket assent in a
particular transaction.
Under a Code provision based on either Brown's model or Murray's,
courts will have little incentive to engage in this kind of analysis. The notion
both the arbitration provision and "that [it] would become part of any [contract resulting from
the exchange of documents] to which [B] expressed assent through... conduct." Murray,
Proposed Revision, supra note 96, at 355-56.
363. Murray, Solutions, supra note 64, at 1364.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 183-86.
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of blanket assent effectively confines contextual inquiry to the issue of unfair
surprise, and inquiry into unfair surprise will produce, at best, an indirect
assessment of the parties' expectations. At worst, it will produce judicial
opinions, like those of the New York courts, that rest on policy relating to
the provisions at issue rather than the status of the provisions in the eyes of
the parties.
Among the models, only Taylor's calls logically for essentially the
same analysis, as applied to the transaction between S and B, as proposed
section 2-204. A Code section based on his model that makes express
reference to implied terms will produce many of the same benefits as the
proposed section. Yet simply because his model describes typical transac-
tions, it will reduce courts' receptivity to evidence of terms or agree-
ments-including those reached via blanket assent-that do not fit the mold.
As a consequence, it will inhibit the inquiry into context that the rest of
Article 2 requires.
Conclusion
When the parties to a sales transaction are bureaucracies rather than
individuals, and when those bureaucracies standardize many of their
transactions,3" blanket assent offers an intuitively appealing account of the
contracting process and the expectations it produces. Indeed, indications are
that the drafters of revised Article 2 will continue to employ the notion in the
law of additional terms. 3" Yet the notion is a preconception that lacks
365. See Elizabeth Warren, LegalRealism: Commentary, 1988 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 49,
51.
366. The most recent version of § 2-207 is as follows:
SECTION 2-207. WHEN VARYING TERMS ARE PART OF CONTRACT.
(a) In [Article 2], "varying terms" means terms prepared by one party
and contained in a standard form writing or record.
(b) If an agreement of the parties contains varying terms, a contract
results if sections 2-204 and 2-206 are satisfied.
(c) Varying terms contained in the writings and other records of the
parties do not become part of a contract unless the party claiming inclusion
proves that the party against whom they operate expressly agreed to the terms
or assented to and had notice of the terms from trade usage, previous course
of dealing or course ofperformance. Between merchants, the burden ofproof
is by a preponderance of the evidence. Otherwise, it is by clear and
convincing evidence.
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empirical support and interferes with the kind of judging Llewellyn envi-
sioned. 67
In an incisive analysis of the language of the 1962 Official Text of the
Code, Professor David Mellinkoff points out that the original drafters,
having introduced the distinction between agreement and contract, went on
to draft sections in which the two notions appeared in a "rapid pirouette," so
that the reader saw "for fleeting moments the face of bargain and the
backside of obligation in one blurred image with the backside of bargain and
the face of obligation. 3 68 Just as the drafters of the revised Code must be
less precise than their predecessors in their conceptions of agreements,J
69
they must be more precise in their use of language. The notion of agreement
(d) If a contract with varying terms is formed under subsection (a), the
terms are:
(1) terms upon which the writings or records agree;
(2) varying terms included under subsection (c);
(3) terms to which the parties have otherwise agreed;
and
(4) any supplementary terms incorporated under any
other provision of [the Code].
July 1994 Draft Revision, supra note 7, at 13. The proposed revision is problematical in
several respects. First, subsection (a) fails to make clear exactly what a "varying" term
varies. Moreover, the subsection relies on the distinction between form and non-form
terms-a distinction that may become obsolete in an age of computer-generated documents.
See supra text accompanying notes 237-38. Second, subsection (b) provides that there may
be a contract even though the parties' agreement "contains" varying terms. It is difficult to
imagine how the agreement can "contain" a varying term, because the term's varying status
seems to indicate that, at least initially, it is proposed by one party and not necessarily agreed
to by the other. And third, although the reference in subsection (c) to trade usage, course of
dealing, and course of performance is most welcome, that subsection refers to "assent" rather
than agreement. As in the current version of the Code, see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1990),
"assent" is undefined, but subsection (c) makes sense only if there can be assent to a term in
the absence of notice of the term; it seems very likely indeed that this is an unexpressed
reference to blanket assent. See also supra note 40. For a general endorsement of the goals
of an earlier version of revised § 2-207, as well as criticism of its language, see Roszkowski
& Wladis, supra note 263. Speidel explains, and illustrates the operation of, an earlier
version of the section in Speidel, supra note 21, at 1326-32.
367. See Danzig, supra note 12; Warner Lawson, Legal Realism: Commentary, 1988
ANN. SuRV. AM. L. 49, 66.
368. David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J.
185, 189 (1967).
369. See generally Gilmore, supra note 1.
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is what permits Llewellyn to answer Friedman, at least in theory, even when
buyers and sellers of goods use documents that include "additional" terms.
The drafters should emphasize that notion by eliminating section 2-207, by
adopting proposed section 2-204, and by employing the terms "agreement"
and "contract" in a consistent fashion throughout Articles 1 and 2.
